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New firm entry is a critical part of the process of creative destruction that Joseph 
Schumpeter (1911) argued is so important for the continued dynamism of the modern economy.  
That it affects economic growth has been documented in previous work.
1 However, much less is 
known about the business environments that promote new firm creation.  This is an important 
concern for policymakers, who in country after country are trying to implement policies that will 
foster entry – witness, for example, the debate in Continental Europe on the lack of home-grown 
venture capital in promoting new firm creation in high tech industries.
2 
A first step is to understand what the cross-country picture really looks like. We use a 
comprehensive, recently available database of firms across a number of developed and transition 
countries in Europe to address this question. Some facts are striking. For instance, one might 
believe that Italy, with so many small firms, should have tremendous entry. Actually, entry in 
Italy (the number of firms less than two years of age to the total number of firms) is only 3.8 
percent compared to 13.5 percent on average for other European countries in the G-7.  
What is especially little understood is the role of regulations, especially bureaucratic 
regulations on setting up limited liability companies, in explaining variations in patterns of entry. 
The early debate on such corporations emphasized the possibility that crooks might register with 
little capital and dupe unsuspecting investors or consumers. For instance, the Times of London 
thundered against the principle of free incorporation through limited liability thus in 1824: 
“Nothing can be so unjust as for a few persons abounding in wealth to offer a portion of their 
excess for the information of a company, to play with that excess for the information of a 
company – to lend the importance of their whole name and credit to the society, and then should 
the funds prove insufficient to answer all demands, to retire into the security of their unhazarded 
fortune, and leave the bait to devoured by the poor deceived fish.”
 3 
 
According to this view, entry regulations serves the public interest by preventing fraud. 
                                                 
1 For example, Hause and Du Rietz (1984), Asplund and Nocke (2003), Black and Strahan (2002). 
2 “Europeans Now Seek to Revive Start-Up Spirit”, Wall Street Journal, February 6, 2002. 
3 As quoted in Paul Halpern, Michael Trebilcock and Stuart Turnbull, 1980, “An Economic Analysis of 
Limited Liability in Corporate Law”, University of Toronto Law Review 117: 30.    2
By contrast, a long literature describes regulations as devices to protect the private 
interests of industry incumbents (see Smith 1776, Olsen 1965, or Stigler 1971) or the regulators 
(Bhagwati 1979, Krueger 1974, McChesney 1997, Shleifer and Vishny 1997). For example, 
Smith (1776) 
4: 
“To widen the market and to narrow the competition is always the interest of the dealers…The 
proposal of any new law or regulation of commerce which comes from this order, ought always 
to be listened to with great precaution, and ought never to be adopted, till after having been long 
and carefully examined, not only with the most scrupulous, but with the most suspicious 
attention. It comes from an order of men, whose interest is never exactly the same with that of the 
public, who generally have an interest to deceive and even oppress the public, and who 
accordingly have, upon many occasions, both deceived and oppressed it.” 
 
The evidence in Djankov et al. (2002) that countries with heavier regulation of entry have 
higher corruption and larger unofficial economies certainly is consistent with the private interest 
view of regulation. But it does not rule out other possibilities – for instance, regulations could be 
less burdensome in corrupt countries because officials can be bribed to ignore them (we do find 
evidence for this) so there is no strong demand to streamline them, or regulations may be 
promulgated in corrupt countries precisely because it is more important for an even more 
untrustworthy corrupt private sector to be screened.   
This suggests a number of steps. First, one has to show that these regulations do affect 
entry. One cannot, however, ascertain this simply from a cross-country regression of actual firm 
entry against the size of regulations. If the coefficient estimate on regulations is negative, the 
skeptic could argue that causality could go the other way – that in countries with generally low 
entry, people are not sufficiently motivated to press for the repeal of archaic regulations that 
impede entry. Thus even though the regulations themselves may have no direct effect on entry, 
there could be a negative correlation between regulatory restrictions and entry.  
To address this sort of problem, we focus on cross-industry, cross-country interaction 
effects (that is, we ask if entry is more likely in an industry with a particular need when the 
                                                 
4 Adam Smith 1776 ed. Edwin Canan 1976. The Wealth of Nations Chicago: University of Chicago Press,  
Book 1, Chapter XI, p. 278.     3
country scores strongly on a characteristic that facilitates meeting the need) rather than on direct 
industry or country effects. In particular, if we can somehow proxy for the “natural” rate of entry 
in an industry, we test whether entry is relatively lower in “naturally high entry” industries when 
they are in countries with high bureaucratic restrictions on entry.    
This methodology, following Rajan and Zingales (1998), enables us to address a number 
of other issues as well – for instance the problem that a healthy economy scores well on a number 
of cross-country variables, so it is hard to estimate the direct effect of each variable in a cross-
country regression (and equally hard to correct for all possible country variables that might 
matter). By focusing on interactions, we can absorb country level variables and instead examine 
the differential effects of country level variables across industries that might respond most to 
them. Also, some industries may be technologically more predisposed to entry. By correcting for 
industry effects, we also correct for the fact that average entry rates depend on the industries 
present in a country.  
 The downside of this methodology is, of course, that while it can tell us whether the 
country characteristics work in predicted economic ways, it cannot tell us the overall magnitude 
of the effect of the characteristics, only the relative magnitude.
5 But since our primary interest is 
to examine the validity of theories that suggest bureaucratic entry regulations should affect entry, 
this is not a major concern. 
We find that “naturally high-entry” industries have relatively lower entry in countries that 
have more onerous bureaucratic entry regulations. This also suggests an explanation for the low 
level of entry in Italy: the average direct cost associated with fulfilling the bureaucratic 
regulations for setting up a new business in Italy is 20 percent of per capita GNP compared to 10 
percent of per capita GNP on average for other G-7 European countries. 
                                                 
5 Of course, we could revert to cross-country regressions for that, but we cannot tell how much of the 
estimated effect is likely to be because of causal relationships and how much is simple correlation. See, 
however, Desai, Gompers, and Lerner (2003).   4
This does indicate that these bureaucratic regulations on entry work as intended but it 
does not help us distinguish between the views that these entry barriers are socially harmful and 
that they are socially beneficial.  If these entry barriers screen appropriately as in the view that 
they are framed in the public interest, we should find that incumbent older firms in naturally high 
entry industries should grow relatively faster (than similar firms in similar industries in countries 
with low entry barriers) because efficient ex ante bureaucratic screening takes the place of 
growth-retarding wasteful competitive destruction. 
By contrast, the private interest view would be more ambiguous in its predictions. By 
setting up protectionist entry barriers, incumbent firms might ensure themselves more growth, but 
the lack of competition may make them inefficient. Also, inefficient incumbent firms would have 
a greater incentive to leave entry barriers in place.
6 A finding that incumbent firms in naturally 
high-entry industries grow relatively less fast in high entry barrier countries would be consistent 
with the private interest view rather than the public interest view. Particularly telling would be if 
these industries also accounted for a relatively lower share of the economy. 
 The evidence is more consistent with the view that entry regulations are framed with 
private interests in mind rather than for the public interest. Growth in value added is relatively 
lower in naturally high entry industries and the share of the industry in the economy is relatively 
lower (though this result is weak), when the industry is in a country with higher bureaucratic 
barriers to entry. 
Finally, it may be that countries with untrustworthy populations erect higher bureaucratic 
barriers so as to screen their fellowmen (though why the bureaucrats should be deemed more 
trustworthy is a relevant question). If this were true, bureaucratic barriers might affect entry, and 
might cause incumbents to become fat and lazy, but this is necessary because the alternative of 
unrestricted entry by charlatans would be much worse. This is a harder proposition to refute but 
                                                 
6 See Acemoglu (2003), Perotti and Volpin (2003), and Rajan and Zingales (2003) for recent interest group 
theories of entry regulation.   5
our analysis offers some evidence that is inconsistent with it. More developed countries have 
better developed information systems, better product inspections and quality control, better 
contract and law enforcement, and consequently, an entrepreneurial population less subject to 
misbehavior.
7 If bureaucratic rules were meant to screen entry efficiently, we should expect them 
to be particularly effective in low-income countries relative to high-income countries. Similarly, 
we should find them particularly effective in corrupt countries. It turns out that entry barriers are 
more effective in preventing firm creation in high income countries, suggesting their purpose is 
not to screen out the untrustworthy (or that low income countries have other natural barriers that 
prevent firm creation).  
More interesting, entry barriers are effective in retarding entry only in the least corrupt 
countries. On the one hand, this suggests that bureaucratic entry barriers in corrupt countries may 
be ineffective roadblocks, meant solely for extracting bribes (see, for example, Shleifer and 
Vishny (1997) and Djankov et al. (2002)). However, their existence and effectiveness in less 
blatantly corrupt countries suggests that their purpose may well be to protect incumbents and 
their rents (see, for example, Acemoglu (2003), Perotti and Volpin (2003), and Rajan and 
Zingales (2003a)).  
While our focus is on bureaucratic regulations on entry, we also examine the effects of 
other regulations. Interestingly, not all regulations inhibit entry. In particular, regulations that go 
in the direction of protecting investors – such as the accounting standards in a country – tend to 
improve access to credit and hence enhance entry. We find entry is relatively higher in industries 
that depend heavily on external finance in countries with better accounting standards. Similarly, 
entry is higher in R&D intensive industries in countries with better protection of intellectual 
                                                 
7 The underlying population in richer countries may also be socialized to be more honest (fewer rogues) but 
all that is relevant is that the richer infrastructure gives them more incentive to behave, so there is less need 
for screening.    6
property. Finally, we also examine other environmental variables, such as the presence of an 
educated labor force. 
Taken together, our results suggest that while bureaucratic entry requirements seem to be 
motivated by private interests, it is by no means obvious that the best way to encourage entry and 
competition is to eliminate all regulation. The absence of some regulations can also be an 
effective entry barrier (see Rajan and Zingales (2003, a, b)). Regulations that expand access to 
finance and human resources seem to help entry even while those that directly screen entrants 
hurt entry. 
In a related paper, Desai, Gompers, and Lerner (2003) use a cross-country approach and 
also find that entry regulations have a negative impact on firm entry. The cross-country approach 
has a number of limitations including variations in coverage in the database across countries, 
which is why we have chosen a within country, cross industry approach. Nevertheless, their 
findings are complementary to ours. Another paper that is closer in methodology to ours is Di 
Patti and Dell’Ariccia (forthcoming). They examine whether entry is higher in informationally 
opaque industries in Italian regions that have a more concentrated banking sector (they find it is). 
Their use of the Rajan and Zingales methodology is similar to ours, but the environmental 
variables they focus on, as well as the data they use, are very different. In another related paper, 
Bertrand and Kamarz (2002) examine the expansion decisions of French retailers following new 
zoning regulations introduced in France. They find a strong relation between increases in entry 
deterrence (such as rejection of expansion or entry decisions) and decreases in employment 
growth. A cross-country study related to ours is Scarpetta et al. (2002), who use firm-level survey 
data from OECD countries to analyze firm entry and exit. They find that higher product market 
and labor regulations are negatively correlated with the entry of small- and medium-sized firms in 
OECD countries. Unlike us, however, they do not focus on country and industry interaction 
effects.    7
There is also work related to other aspects of our study than entry regulation. Kumar, 
Rajan and Zingales (2000) find that the average size of firms in human capital intensive industries 
(and in R&D intensive industries) is larger in countries that protect property rights (patents). 
Using survey data from five transition countries on the reinvestment of profits by entrepreneurs, 
Johnson et. al. (2002) examine the importance of property rights. They find lower investment by 
entrepreneurs in countries with weak property rights. Claessens and Laeven (2003) find that 
growth of industries that rely on intangible assets is disproportionally lower in countries with 
weak intellectual property rights. Our finding that there is less entry in R&D intensive industries 
when intellectual property is weakly enforced echoes their findings. Finally, others have also 
found that financial development seems to foster entry (see Black and Strahan (2002) or Rajan 
and Zingales (1998)). 
There is a substantial literature on entry into an industry (possibly by a firm from another 
industry) as distinguished from firm creation. It is the latter sense in which we use the term 
“entry”. It would take us too much out of our way to describe the literature on industry entry, so 
we refer the reader to Gilbert (1989) for a comprehensive survey. Note that there are 
technological determinants of entry into an industry such as minimum scale, etc., which also 
affect firm creation. We assume these determinants carry over countries so they are absorbed by 
industry indicators. Our focus then is on environmental determinants of firm creation.                         
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section I we describe the data and in Section II we 
present the empirical methodology. We present the empirical results in Section III. We conclude 
in Section IV.  
 
I. Data 
1.1 Amadeus database 
Central to our analysis is the firm-level Amadeus database. Amadeus is a commercial 
database provided by Bureau van Dijk. It contains financial information on over 5 million private   8
and publicly owned firms across 34 Western and Eastern European countries. The database 
includes up to 10 years of information per company, although coverage varies by country. 
Amadeus is especially useful because it covers a large fraction of new and small- and medium-
sized companies (SMEs) across all industries. The Amadeus database is created by collecting 
standardized data received from 50 vendors across Europe. The local source for this data is 
generally the office of the Registrar of Companies. 
The Amadeus database includes firm-level accounting data in standardized financial 
format for 22 balance sheet items, 22 income statement items and 21 financial ratios.
8 The 
accounts are transformed into a universal format to enhance comparison across countries. 
Although EU harmonization in accounting standards and practices has improved the 
comparability of accounting formats across countries in Europe, differences in accounting 
practices remain and these transformed accounts should therefore be interpreted with the 
necessary caution. We use IMF-IFS period average exchange rates to convert all accounting data 
into U.S. dollars.  
In addition to financial information, Amadeus also provides other firm-level information. 
First, we use information on the year of incorporation to calculate the age of the firm. Second, we 
use firm-level employment to calculate the contribution of new and small firms to employment 
creation. Third, Amadeus includes the national industry code and assigns companies a 3-digit 
NACE code – the European standard of industry classification – which we use to classify firms 
and construct industry dummy variables.
9  In our analysis, we use NACE codes at a 2-digit level 
so that we have a sufficient number of firms per industry. 
1.2 Sample selection  
                                                 
8 The coverage of these specific items varies across countries.  For example, many firms in Latvia and 
Russia have turnover variables missing and most firms in Slovenia and Croatia only report total liabilities 
and do not include a breakdown of their debt structures. 
9 The NACE codes follow the NACE Revision 1 classification.   9
We use the 2001 edition of Amadeus and limit our sample to the years 1998 and 1999.
10  
There are two reasons to limit our analysis thus. First, there is the potential problem of 
survivorship: As companies exit or stop reporting their financial statements, Amadeus puts a "not 
available/missing" for 4 years following the last included filing. Firms are not removed from the 
database unless there is no reporting for at least 5 years (i.e. 1997 or earlier). So the data for firms 
from 1997 as reported in the 2001 database will not include firms that exited in 1997 or before. 
To avoid this potential survivorship bias, we restrict our attention to 1998 and 1999. A second 
reason is that efforts were made in 1998 to expand the coverage for Central and Eastern European 
countries allowing us to include more countries, but making the prior data less comparable.
11  
As shown in Table 1, Column 1, we start with a sample in Amadeus of about 3 million 
annual observations over the years 1998-1999. We then impose a number of restrictions on the 
data. First, we require reporting firms to have some basic accounting information in their 
accounts over the years (i.e., data on total assets, sales, profit before tax, or employment). The 
reason for dropping those that do not report is that there may be country differences in the criteria 
for including firms with no information on their accounts. In addition, this criterion excludes any 
“phantom” firms established for tax or other purposes. 
Next we delete from our sample firms that report only consolidated statements. For most 
firms in Amadeus, unconsolidated statements are reported and consolidated statements are 
provided when available.
12 We use unconsolidated financial statements to avoid double-counting 
firms and subsidiaries. Using unconsolidated statements has the additional advantage that we can 
focus on the local operations of firms and not overestimate local employment figures. For 
example, the consolidated statements of a European multinational include operations abroad and 
                                                 
10 Due to lags in data collection, the coverage for the year 2000 is incomplete. 
11 For example, the coverage of Central and Eastern European firms increased by 16% from 1997 to 1998, 
but less than 5%, on average, for the following 2 years. 
12 Although the small number of deleted firms does not creates a significant bias in entry rates based on 
total number of corporations, this may create some bias in the total employment figures, since consolidated 
firms tend to be larger.  However, some employment may already be included by other group firms in the 
sample with unconsolidated statements.   10
the employment figures refer to worldwide employment. Our use of unconsolidated statements 
also helps comparability because not all European countries require consolidation of accounts for 
all firms. 
We also exclude certain industries. First, we drop several primary industries where the 
activity is country-specific (e.g., not all countries have uranium mines). These industries include 
Agriculture (NACE code 1), Forestry (NACE code 2), Fishing (NACE code 5), and Mining 
(NACE codes 10-14). We also exclude utilities (NACE codes 40-41) that tend to be regulated and 
largely state-owned industries in Europe.
13 We also drop the financial services industries (NACE 
codes 65 and 66) because financial ratios for financial companies are not comparable to those of 
non-financial companies. In addition, financial institutions tend to be subject to specific entry 
restrictions, (e.g. initial capital requirements) that do not apply to nonfinancial firms.
14 Finally, 
we drop the government/public sector, education (mainly public sector in Europe), health and 
social sector, activities of organizations, private households, extra-territorial organizations, and 
firms that cannot be classified (NACE codes 75, 80, 85, 91, 92, 95, and 99).
15 We also exclude, 
by country, any industries with less then three firms (although we check whether such an 
exclusion affects our results qualitatively). We are left with 47 NACE industries, which is the 
maximum number of observations per country. 
Finally, we exclude all legal forms other than the equivalent of public and private limited 
liability corporations.
16 In particular, we exclude proprietorships and partnerships. Two 
arguments prompt this. First, a big and common carrot behind registration as corporations is 
limited liability, which allows entrepreneurs and investors to take risks. By contrast, the benefits 
                                                 
13 We also drop the recycling industry (NACE code 37), which is difficult to match with a comparable SIC 
code(s). 
14 See Caprio, Barth, and Levine (2004) for a discussion of financial sector regulations across countries. 
15 For robustness, we exclude additional industries that may be state-controlled, such as all mining 
activities. 
16 We include Plc and Ltd in the UK, AG and GmbH in Germany, and SA and SARL in France and exclude 
the GmbH & Co KG, which is a hybrid legal form (a combination of a partnership and a private limited 
company) used in Austria and Germany.   11
of registration as other forms may vary considerably across countries, which will make the 
analysis less easy to interpret.
17 Second, the coverage of proprietorships and other unincorporated 
firms in Amadeus is poor and uneven: in most European countries only limited liability 
companies are required to file statements. However, most European countries require all 
corporations to file financial statements, therefore, the coverage for corporations is extensive and 
the best available. We use the information on legal form in Amadeus – which is country-specific 
– to identify public and private limited companies (see Annex 4 for legal definitions, by country).   
We exclude from our sample several European countries where the coverage is 
incomplete or the data quality is poor. In Annex 2, we summarize the cross-country differences in 
the collection of company accounts in Amadeus. First, we exclude Switzerland, since small firms 
are not required to file. Second, we exclude the countries of the former Republic of Yugoslavia 
(Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia), which were at war during our sample period and where data coverage is limited. 
Third, we exclude Slovakia, Slovenia, Russia and the Ukraine, which have only a very small 
number of total filings (i.e. less than 1,000 firms annually).   
As shown in Table 1, Column 2, after applying these exclusion criteria, we have a 
smaller, comprehensive sample of incorporated firms in a large number of European countries, 
which enhances comparability across countries.
18 Our sample now has over 3 million annual 
firms and 57 million employees.   
We are not done yet. We have national statistics from Eurostat (2003) on numbers of, and 
employment in, firms of different sizes. In Table 2, we compare the ratio of firms and 
employment in Amadeus and in published national statistics in Eurostat (2003).
19 Columns 1 and 
2 show the coverage in Amadeus of large firms (the ratio of firms and employment at firms with 
                                                 
17 For example, Fan and White (2003) use data on small businesses in the United States to show that 
personal liability negatively affects the level of entrepreneurial activity and the decision to incorporate. 
18 These restrictions exclude 342,216 firms over 2 years (9.8% of total firms). 
19 Data, by firm size, is unavailable for non-EU countries. This data will be updated to compare EU 
corporations when the data becomes available in 2004.   12
more than 250 employees in Amadeus versus that in national statistics) and Columns 3 and 4 
show the coverage of small firms (the ratio of firms and employment at firms with 10-50 
employees in Amadeus versus that in national statistics). Column 5 shows the absolute value of 
the difference between the ratio of employment in small firms to the ratio of employment in large 
firms in Amadeus less the ratio of employment at small and large firms in national statistics. This 
ratio is used to test whether our Amadeus sample is biased towards larger firms.
20 
We exclude a country from our dataset if two conditions are met: (1) if the ratio of 
employment in firms with more than 250 employees in Amadeus to that in national statistics 
(Column 2) is less than 50%, and (2) if the absolute difference between the ratios in Amadeus and 
national statistics of employment in firms with 10-50 employees to employment in firms with 
greater than 250 employees (Column 5) is more than 25%. Four countries do not meet the 
criteria: Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg and Portugal. Since these cutoffs may be considered 
somewhat arbitrary, we also test if the qualitative results hold if we do not apply these criteria. 
We believe that our inclusion criteria create the most comparable sample of firms across 
countries, but we should be cautious about deriving strong conclusions from direct cross-country 
comparisons. However, even if we have not eliminated all biases between countries, our basic test 
examines within-country differences across countries, and will not be affected unless there are 
systematic biases in reporting industries within a country. Our final sample includes 3,371,073 
firms in 21 countries: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, 
Poland, Romania, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.   
1.3  Industry-level entry variables  
We measure entry in a variety of different ways, both for all new firms and by size 
groups. We define a new firm as a firm that has age 1 or 2 and an old firm as a firm that has age 
                                                 
20 The discrepancy between Amadeus and national figures may also be explained by: (1) that for a 
significant number of firms in Amadeus, we do not have data on employment and (2) that for the purpose 
of cross-country comparisons, our Amadeus dataset excludes only proprietorships and partnerships.   13
greater than 2. 
21  Our analysis focuses on the contribution of new firms to the total number of 
firms and to employment creation, measured as (1) the percentage of new firms and (2) the 
percentage of employment at new firms. Our employment ratio should be used cautiously, 
however, since 38% of total firms do not report employment.
22 We calculate entry rates at the 2-
digit NACE industry level averaged over the years 1998 and 1999.
23 We refer to this variable as 
Entry.
24 
We require firms to survive at least one year and exclude firms in year 0. We exclude 
firms less than 1 year to avoid frivolous filings and because of the difference in initial filing 
requirements across countries.
25 In particular, in some countries firms in their first year do not 
have to file accounting information until after the end of their first year of operation, while in 
others they have up to 1 year to file. We check that the results are not qualitatively affected by 
including firms of age less than 1 as new firms.  
In Table 3, we describe the country averages of the entry variables that we use in our 
analysis. We calculate entry and new firm employment rates for (1) all firms and (2) firms with 
more than 10 employees. Our data for firms with greater than 10 employees are less 
comprehensive since employment (which we need to classify firms) is missing for about 38% of 
observations in our sample. As shown in Column 1, the average entry rate across industries and 
countries is about 13.3% (or 9.2% when excluding small firms). Since we define new firms as 2 
years or younger, this is calculated over two years, on average, and corresponds to an average 
annual entry rate of about 6.6% (or 4.6% when excluding small firms). We find large variations 
in the share of new firms across countries, varying from a high entry rate of 19.2% in Lithuania to 
a low entry rate of 3.5% in Italy. Overall, we find an average of about 15.7% of new firms in 
                                                 
21 Our empirical results are robust to defining new firms as age equal to one. 
22 However, employment data in the UK is missing for over 85% of firms.  For this reason we check that all 
econometric tests that use employment cut-offs are robust to the exclusion of UK data. 
23 Our empirical results are robust to using entry rates calculated for one year (1998 or 1999) only. 
24 For a complete list of variable names and definitions, see Appendix 1. 
25 However, this does not affect our results. The median share of firms with age 0 over the period 1998-99 
is 2.5 percent.   14
Eastern European countries, as compared to 11.9% for Western European countries. This 
difference reflects the recent emergence of a large number of private firms in the transition 
economies.   
Djankov et al. (2002) have data on the procedures that are officially required for an 
entrepreneur to obtain all necessary permits, and to notify and file with all requisite authorities, in 
order to legally operate a business. These data refer to 1999. These procedures include (i) 
obtaining all the necessary permits and licenses, and (ii) completing all the required inscriptions, 
verifications and notifications to enable the company to start operation.  To make the procedures 
and companies comparable across countries, the survey assumes that the company is a limited 
liability company, i.e., a corporation, and the founders complete all procedures themselves 
(without intermediaries). This means the entry barriers are likely to be more onerous for small 
firms where this is likely to be true. We report in Table 3 column 5 the direct costs of setting up a 
new business expressed as a percentage of per capita GNP in US dollars. We find large variations 
in the cost of entry, varying from a high cost of 86 percent of GNP per capita in Hungary to a low 
cost of 1 percent of GNP per capita in Finland and the UK. 
In Table 4, we present entry rates by country and a selection of industries based on 
groupings of 2-digit NACE codes.  The highest entry rates are in communications (telephone, 
wireless, etc.), computer services, and services, and the lowest entry into the manufacturing of 
chemicals, construction, and transportation. The industries with high entry rates are generally 
those related to the high-tech sector, which experienced global growth over the late 1990s.   
Industries with lower entry rates are those that similarly faced a global decline in the late 1990s 
(construction) as well as traditionally more concentrated industries (such as transportation).    
As a comparison, we calculate 1-year entry rates in the United States from the Dun and 
Bradstreet  (D&B) database of over 7 million corporations. We consider D&B statistics over 
1998-99 for corporations and U.S. employment only (instead of total employees internationally), 
for better comparison to the Amadeus data. We refer to this variable as EntryUS.  Table 4 presents   15
U.S. entry rates (EntryUS) for broad groupings of NACE codes.
26  Annex 3 shows U.S. entry rates 
for all 2-digit NACE codes.  In comparing the Dun and Bradstreet data to our 1-year European 
entry rates, we find in the U.S. similar high entry rates in the computer and communications 
industries and low entry rates in industries such as mining, and water utilities. In general, we see 
higher entry rates in high-tech sector and lower entry rates in infrastructure related sectors.   
In Table 5, we examine the size (measured by number of employees) distribution of 
entering firms, averaged over 1998 and 1999.  The data confirm that most of the entry occurs in 
small firms. Interestingly, we find a greater fraction of new, larger firms in the Eastern European 
transition countries.  This suggests that new, private firms are emerging across all size groups, 
rather than only small firms that require time to grow.  This may also reflect a number of larger, 
state-owned firms that continue to be privatized and reincorporated following the transition.
27  On 
average, we find that about 63% of new firms have less than 10 employees, 23% have 10-50 
employees, 12% have 50-250 employees and 2% have more than 250 employees.  Since new 
firms in this largest category are likely to be existing firms that reincorporate following a merger 
or acquisition, we check that our qualitative results hold when we exclude new firms with more 
than 250 employees.  
 
II. Methodology 
We explore the differential effects of certain country characteristics on entry across 
industries with different natural demands for that characteristic. In other words, we are interested 
in the interaction between country and industry-specific variables.  We use industry indicators to 
control for level differences across industries and country indicators to control for level 
differences across countries.  The model is as follows: 
                                                 
26 We use the International Concordance between the U.S. 1987 SIC and the NACE Rev. 1 industrial 
classifications to match the 4-digit level SIC codes used by D&B with the 2-digit level NACE codes used 
in Amadeus. 
27 An exception to the transition countries is Romania, which includes over 200,000 firms with less than 10 
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where a subscript j indicates industry j, a subscript k indicates country k, and uppercase 
coefficients indicate vectors.  The dependent variable is the ratio of new firms to total firms of 
industry j in country k.  We will explore several alternative definitions of what constitutes new 
firms.  The industry indicators correct for industry-specific effects. Similarly, the country 
indicators correct for country-specific variables.
28 The industry j share of total sales in country k 
captures an industry-specific convergence effect: we correct for the possibility that sectors that 
are large relative to the rest of the economy experience lower entry rates.
29  Finally,  k j, ε  is an 
error term with the usual distributional assumptions.  The focus is on the interaction term and its 
coefficient  4 φ . 
  The critical aspect, of course, is the country characteristic and the industry characteristic. 
The country characteristic we focus on is the cost of fulfilling the bureaucratic requirements to 
register a company. Costly entry regulations will make it more difficult for new firms to enter. 
Djankov et al. (2002) calculate the direct costs associated with starting-up a business as a 
percentage of per capita GNP in 1999. Following their work, we term the log of this variable 
EntCost.
30  
                                                 
28 One of the omitted variables that may explain cross-country variation in incorporation rates is differences 
in the tax regimes and tax treatments of corporations. In many countries, limited companies are set up for 
tax purposes rather than entrepreneurial activities.  If this taxation difference varies across countries, this 
would create a hard to quantify bias.  The country indicators, however, control for such differences across 
countries. 
29 We get similar results when we use value added rather than sales as a measure of relative industry size, 
but prefer to use sales as a measure of size because value added figures are missing for several industries in 
a number of countries. 
30 We use the log of the entry cost variable (which takes values of between zero and 1 because it is 
expressed in percentage terms of per capita GNP) so that in absolute terms higher costs are associated with 
lower values.   17
  The industry characteristic we use stems from the methodology used by Rajan and 
Zingales (1998). We would expect industries that naturally have low entry barriers to be most 
affected by regulations on entry. We therefore need to know what entry would look like if there 
were few artificial or infrastructural barriers to entry – not just bureaucratic barriers but also other 
potential barriers like rigid labor regulation or poor access to financing. Under the assumption 
that these barriers are low in the United States (for instance, entry costs in the U.S. are 0.5 percent 
of per capita GNP relative to an average of 20 percent of per capita GNP in our sample of 
European countries), we would expect the rate of entry in an industry in the United States to be a 
good proxy for the “natural” propensity for entry in that industry – reflecting technological 
barriers in that industry like economies of scale or incumbent organizational efficiencies obtained 
from experience. Of course, there is a degree of heroism in assuming that entry in the United 
States does not suffer from artificial barriers (or even in assuming that there is a clear distinction 
between natural and artificial barriers). Nevertheless, all that is important for us is that the rank 
ordering of entry in the United States corresponds to the rank ordering of natural barriers across 
industries, and this rank ordering carries over to other countries. 
As a measure of industry share, we use the Amadeus database to construct the fraction of 
the industry’s sales in total sales of firms in the country. We refer to this variable as Industry 
Share. We use the average of this variable for the years 1998-1999.  We calculate this country-
industry level variable for 2-digit NACE industries using data in Amadeus.  These industry shares 
in total sales are expected to capture a potential convergence effect.   
  In the basic regression then, EntCost is our country characteristic and EntryUS is the 
industry characteristic indicating whether the industry has “naturally high entry”. If as 
hypothesized, bureaucratic entry requirements do have effect, they should particularly impede 
entry in industries that are naturally prone to entry (or seen another way, entry into an industry   18
that is a natural monopoly should be little affected by the existence of bureaucratic entry barriers). 
So we expect coefficient  4 φ  to be negative. 
III. Results 
3.1  The Basic Regression and Permutations  
In Table 6A, column (i) we present the basic regression, estimated using a Tobit 
regression with censoring at 0 and 1. The coefficient of the interaction term is negative and 
significant at the 1 percent level. Since we take the log of entry cost, which takes values between 
zero and one, lower entry costs result in a more negative value for our entry cost variable. 
Together with the negative coefficient on the interaction term, this means that we find that 
relative entry into industries with high entry in the U.S. is disproportionally higher in countries 
with low entry costs. 
Since this is a difference in difference estimate, it is worth pointing out what the 
coefficient means. Take an industry like retail trade (NACE code 52) that is at the 75
th percentile 
of EntryUS and an industry like manufacturing of pulp, paper, and paper products (NACE code 
21) that is at the 25
th percentile of EntryUS. The coefficient estimate suggests that the difference in 
entry rates between retail and pulp in the Czech Republic (that is at the 25
th percentile in terms of 
EntCost with entry costs equal to 8 percent of per capita GNP) is 0.5 percentage points higher 
than the difference in entry rates between the same industries in Italy (that is at the 75
th percentile 
in terms of EntCost with entry costs equal to 20 percent of per capita GNP). In other words, 
moving from Italy to the Czech Republic benefits the high entry retail sector relatively more.  As 
a comparison, the mean difference in entry rates between the retail and pulp industries across 
countries is 5.0 percent. This suggests that the effect of regulatory entry barriers accounts for 
about 10 percent of the mean difference.    19
In column (ii) we use as an alternative entry regulation variable the logarithm of the 
number of procedures required to set up a business from Djankov et al. (2002).
31  Our results are 
robust.  We find higher entry rates into industries with high entry in the U.S. in countries with 
fewer entry procedures. The coefficient estimate suggests that the difference in entry rates 
between retail and pulp in Sweden (that is at the 25
th percentile in terms of the number of entry 
procedures) is 0.8 percentage points higher than the difference in entry rates between the same 
industries in Spain (that is at the 75
th percentile in terms of the number of entry procedures).   In 
column (iii) we include the monetized value of the entrepreneur’s time to set up a business in the 
cost of entry. We obtain this variable from Djankov et al. (2002). The results are robust to using 
this alternative measure of the cost of entry regulation. 
Next, we estimate using different samples. In column (iv), we exclude transition 
countries. Privatization has resulted in the emergence of a large number of private firms in these 
economies, and we want to make sure our results are not driven by this. Our results are robust to 
the exclusion of these countries. Our results are also robust to adding back those countries that 
failed to meet our inclusion criteria (i.e., Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg and Portugal), and to 
dropping one country at a time (not reported).   
In column (v) we present estimates restricting the sample to firms with over 10 
employees.  Since many firms that include information on age and sector are missing 
employment (and financial data), we exclude industries where more than 50% of firms have 
missing employment data (about 13% of observations).  With the caution that employment 
coverage is limited, we find that the coefficient for the interaction term is negative and 
statistically significant 
Next, we try different methods of estimating. In column (vi), we estimate an OLS 
regression rather than Tobit.  In column (vii) we estimate our regression using weighted least 
squares (WLS) with the logarithm of the number of corporations, by industry and country, as our 
                                                 
31 The maximum value of number of entry procedures in the sample is 16, for Italy and Romania.   20
weights.  We expect our entry rates to be more precisely estimated for industries with a larger 
number of firms. In both estimations the size of the interaction coefficient remains significant.   
Finally, we consider different measures of entry. In column (viii) the dependent variable 
is the fraction of employment in new firms rather than the ratio of the number of new firms to the 
total.  This is calculated as the number of employees at new firms divided by total employment.   
We exclude industries where more than 50% of firms have missing employment data and large 
new firms (with more than 250 employees), which are likely to be mergers or spin-offs of 
existing firms. We find a negative, but insignificant, coefficient estimate on the interaction term.
32 
Since entry barriers are more likely to bind for small firms, we should expect a weakening of the 
basic result here. 
3.2. Robustness to outliers 
Our estimation strategy can be thought of as a difference-in-difference estimation, where 
we divide the countries into two groups: High entry regulation (HR) and low entry regulation 
(LR), and the industries into two groups: High entry (HE) and Low entry (LE). If we abstract 
away from any control variables, our estimate is: [HE(HR) – LE(HR)] – [HE(LR) – LE(LR)]. 
This estimate captures the average effect only. For robustness, we employ a similar non-
parametric difference-in-difference estimation strategy to investigate whether the effect is 
generally present in all countries and industries.
33 
We first divide the countries into HR and LR, and then rank the industries from the 
lowest natural entry to the highest. Next, we pick the lowest natural entry industry (LWE) as our 
reference industry, and repeat the difference-in-difference estimation above for each remaining 
industry J, i.e., we compute: [J(HR) – LWE(HR)] – [(J(LR) – LWE(LR)], for each industry J. In 
Figure 1 we plot the result against the ordered industries. 
                                                 
32 We also find an insignificant and negative coefficient if we include firms with more than 250 employees. 
33 We thank Atif Mian for this suggestion.   21
The effect is strongest for the computer and related activities (NACE 72) and post and 
telecommunications (NACE 64) industries. We also find that, on average, the effect is larger (i.e., 
DD is more negative) for industries with higher natural entry (as indicated by the plotted 
regression line in Figure 1), but the effect is not linear across countries (not all observations are 
on the regression line). 
Next, we repeat the exercise for countries, i.e., we divide industries into low entry (LE) 
and high entry (HE), and order countries from Lowest to Highest entry regulation. In figure 2, we 
plot the result against the ordered countries. Again, we find that the average effect is consistent 
with our main results, although the effect is not present in all countries. The effect is strongest for 
Norway and the United Kingdom. What is reassuring is that no industry or country appear to be 
driving the results. 
3.3. Alternative Measures  
In Table 6B we examine alternatives to U.S. entry rates as measures of the natural 
propensity to enter.  In columns (i-ii) we use other measures of mobility. We calculate ExitUS, 
which is the share of firms that exit in the U.S. Dun and Bradstreet data.  It is calculated as the 
number of firms that exited in year t (because of closure or acquisition) as a percentage of all 
firms in year t-1. This measure is averaged for the industry over the period 1998-99. Prior 
literature (Dunne et al. 1988) finds that exit rates and entry rates are strongly correlated – the 
more there is creation through young firms, the more destruction there also is. So ExitUS should 
serve as a proxy for “natural entry” and when we replace EntryUS with it in the regression, the 
interaction has the appropriate negative sign and is significant.   
In column (ii) we also use the Dunn and Bradstreet data to calculate SME, the ratio of 
Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs), which we define as businesses with less than 250 
employees.  Since new firms are generally also small, we expect greater entry into industries with 
larger shares of smaller firms.  Indeed, we find a significantly negative coefficient, suggesting 
that higher entry costs discourage entry to industries with larger shares of SMEs.   22
In columns (iii-iv) we use measures of market size, by 2-digit NACE industry and 
country.   We use the Compustat data of U.S. listed firms to calculate SCALE as the log of 
median total assets and SIZE as the log of median total sales.  Total assets and sales take values 
less than 1 (they are divided by 10 billion US dollars) so that the log is a negative number, and 
more negative values denote smaller sized industries. Since entry costs are more negative when 
low, the positive coefficient indicates smaller scale/size industries have relatively more entry in 
low entry cost countries.   
Columns (v-vi) use Compustat data on U.S. firms to calculate measures of concentration.  
In column (v) we calculate the share of total sales in the largest 4 firms (as measured by total 
sales) by 2-digit NACE code and country, and in column (vi) we calculate the Herfindahl-
Hirschman measure of industry concentration.  We test the null hypothesis that since entry should 
be higher in less concentrated industries, a positive coefficient suggests that if entry costs are 
high, entry should be lower in industries with less concentration.  For both measures of 
concentration, we find positive but statistically insignificant coefficients.  One explanation is that 
industries dominated by a few large firms may have substantial entry.  For example, although the 
car manufacturing sector is dominated by a few international firms, there are many small and new 
firms that provide intermediate goods.  
3.4  The Consequences of Preventing Free Entry 
Thus far, we have focused on how bureaucratic entry regulations differentially affect 
entry. This does indicate that these bureaucratic rules work as intended but it does not help us 
distinguish between the views that these entry barriers are socially harmful and that they are 
socially beneficial. If these entry barriers screen appropriately as in the view that they are framed 
in the public interest, we should find that incumbent older firms in naturally high entry industries 
should grow relatively faster (than similar industries in countries with low entry barriers) because 
efficient ex ante bureaucratic screening takes the place of growth-retarding wasteful competitive   23
destruction. These industries should account for a relatively larger share of the economy. An 
opposite finding would be more consistent with the private interest view.    
In Table 7, we examine the effect of entry regulation on the relative performance and 
share of incumbent or established firms, defined as all firms with age more than 2 (i.e., we 
exclude new firms though we get similar results if we include them). We use the growth in value 
added per employee as a measure of firm performance and the industry’s share in value added as 
our measure of industry size. To reduce the influence of outliers, the dependent variable in the 
regressions in this table are censored.   
In columns (i-iv), we show Tobit estimations where the dependent variable is the Real 
Growth in Value Added per employee over the period 1998-99 averaged over all incumbent firms 
in the industry in a country. Value added is computed as Earnings before interest, taxes, 
depreciation and amortization, plus labor costs. In column (i), the negative significant coefficient 
estimate on the interaction variable indicates that incumbent firms in naturally high entry 
industries have relatively less growth in value added when they are in a country with high entry 
regulations. 
Again, it is worth pointing out what the coefficient means by comparing the retail trade 
industry that is at the 75
th percentile of EntryUS and the pulp and paper manufacturing industry 
that is at the 25
th percentile of EntryUS. The coefficient estimate suggests that the difference in real 
growth rates between retail and pulp in the Czech Republic (that is at the 25
th percentile in terms 
of EntCost) is 0.7 percentage points higher than the difference in real growth rates between the 
same industries in Italy (that is at the 75
th percentile in terms of EntCost). In other words, moving 
from Italy to the Czech Republic benefits the growth rate of the high entry retail sector relatively 
more. Since the average real growth rate is 1.0 percent, this is a sizeable magnitude. 
We also include other measures of firm entry.  Column (ii) shows that our results are 
robust to the substitution of entry rates with the percentage of SMEs, defined as firms with less 
than 250 employees.  Columns (iii-iv) show a significant effect of the interaction of market size   24
and entry costs.  Columns (v-viii) show that our results are robust to including legal origins in La 
Porta, et al. (1998) as an instrument for entry regulation. 
Finally, in column (ix), the dependent variable is the share of incumbent firms in the 
industry in overall value added for the country in 1999. We find a negative coefficient estimate, 
but the effect is not statistically significant. One possible explanation is that entry barriers persist 
in countries where high-entry industries are large and thus have the political power to lobby for 
the barriers. When this is set against the fact that the barriers retard growth in these industries, we 
may find an insignificant coefficient of the interaction on average industry share. 
Taken together, these results suggest that entry regulations seem to adversely affect the 
growth (and to a lesser extent the size) of those industries that might be presumed to most benefit 
by the added selectivity that such regulation might bring. This strongly suggests that such 
regulations are not intended in the public interest. 
3.5  Selection Issues 
The last findings, however, suggest potential selection problems. One way to test the 
direction of causality is to use instruments. It has been generally found that the origin of a 
country’s legal system seems to be strongly associated with the regulatory system in place today 
(see, for example, La Porta et al. (1999)). While there has been some debate about the precise 
mechanism by which this association exists, a country’s legal origin offers a proxy for 
predetermined components of regulation. When we instrument entry regulation with legal origin, 
we find that the coefficient estimate for the interaction term is highly significant, the same sign 
and approximately the same magnitude as shown earlier in Tables  6 and 6A (see Table 8 column 
(i-v)).
34  
A second concern is that countries with more untrustworthy populations may erect higher 
bureaucratic barriers so as to screen would be entrepreneurs more carefully. If this were true, 
                                                 
34 The legal origin variables explain 59 percent of the variation in the entry cost variable. Entry costs tend 
to be lowest in countries with Anglo-Saxon and Scandinavian legal origin and highest in countries with 
French legal origin.   25
bureaucratic barriers might affect entry, and might cause incumbents to become fat and lazy, but 
this is necessary because the alternative of unrestricted entry by charlatans would be much worse.  
This question is partly addressed by the instrumental variable regression above. Another 
way to address it is to check if indeed the underlying population results in differential selection.  
More developed countries have better developed information systems, better product inspections 
and quality control, better contract and law enforcement, and consequently, an entrepreneurial 
population less subject to misbehavior.
35 If bureaucratic rules were meant to screen entry 
efficiently, we should expect them to be particularly effective in low-income countries relative to 
high-income countries. In Table 8 column (vii) we estimate different slopes for the interaction 
variable for whether the industry is in an above-sample-median per capita income country or 
below sample-median per capita income country. If, in fact, entry regulations screened more 
effectively in low income countries where there is less alternative infrastructure to assure 
compliance, we should find the coefficient estimate for the interaction in below-sample-median 
income countries to be significantly more negative. It is not.
36  
Similarly we find that entry barriers work most effectively in preventing entry in low 
corruption countries rather than in high corruption countries (Table 8, column (viii)), suggesting 
their purpose cannot be to select amongst an untrustworthy population. This finding is interesting 
in its own right for it suggests that while the purpose of entry barriers in corrupt countries may 
well be to extract bribes and not so much to prevent entry, their purpose in less corrupt countries 
may indeed be to protect incumbents.  
Taken together, these results suggest that the regulation of entry cannot be attributed to 
benign neglect or to the prevailing untrustworthiness of the private sector in a country – it seems 
purposeful and probably intended to protect inefficient incumbent firms. 
                                                 
35 The underlying population in richer countries may also be socialized to be more honest (less adverse 
selection) but all we need is that the richer infrastructure gives them more incentive to behave, so there is 
less need for screening.  
36 When allowing for different slopes for transition versus non-transition countries, we find a stronger effect 
for non-transition countries, i.e., for countries where we expect a stronger legal system etc. (not shown).   26
3.6  Other Regulations and the Business Environment 
  We have focused on the regulation of entry. There are, however, other regulations and 
aspects of the business environment that might affect entry. Let us consider some in this sub 
section. 
3.6.1. Labor regulation 
First consider labor market regulation, specifically laws that prevent a firm from firing 
employees. This could cut both ways.  One could argue that strict labor regulations protect 
employees and give them the confidence to join small, untested firms (much in the way that good 
corporate governance offers investors confidence), thus reducing start up costs. There may be 
other forces at work in the same direction. Regulations may hamper the growth of large 
incumbent firms, whose adherence to regulations is more easily monitored, thus creating the 
space for new firms to enter. However, one could argue for the opposite effect of labor 
regulations on entry:  the cost of compliance with regulations may have fixed components, which 
make them particularly costly for small businesses to meet, and could inhibit entry. Small firms 
may not be able to afford to keep their employees through downturns, and thus might under hire 
in the face of strict labor regulations. 
We use a measure of firing costs obtained from Nicoletta et al. (2000) that captures the 
costs of individual dismissals of employees with regular contracts. The measure is calculated 
using factor analysis of original data collected by the OECD (1999) and ranges from 0 to 6, with 
a higher score indicating a higher cost. The data refer to 1998. We refer to this index as the cost 
of dismissals, or LabCost. Unfortunately we do not have this measure for all firms in our sample, 
so we also use a more general index from Botero et al. (2003), which indicates the strictness of 
labor regulations in the country in 1997. This index, the Employment laws index, was constructed 
by examining the detailed provisions in the labor laws regarding alternative employment 
contracts, conditions of employment, and job security.  The index takes values between 0 and 3,   27
with higher values implying that regulation is more protective of a worker. We refer to this index 
as EmpLaw. 
Following our methodology, we need to find an industry characteristic that would make 
an industry most susceptible to labor regulation. We would expect labor regulations to impinge 
the most on industries that are most labor intensive. We calculate Labor Intensity, LabInt, from 
US data. It is the industry median over all Compustat firms in that industry of the number of 
employees divided by the amount of fixed assets (in millions of dollars), and is calculated over all 
firm-years in the 1998-99.
37 A higher score indicates higher labor intensity.
38  
We report summary statistics and correlations for industry and country level variables in 
Table 9 and regression estimates in Table 10. In Table 10, column (i) the country variable is the 
OECD measure of the cost of dismissal.  The interaction coefficient is negative and significant. In 
column (ii), it is the more widely available but more general index from Botero et al. (2003). The 
coefficient estimate remains negative and significant. Note that the Botero et al. index is a more 
general measure of labor protection that in addition to the ability to dismiss workers (job security) 
includes other aspects of labor protection, such as alternative employment contracts and 
conditions of employment. We conclude that there is strong evidence that labor protection 
hampers entry in labor intensive industries. 
3.6.2 Regulations Protecting Property 
Lest the reader believe that we are on our way to advocating some sort of anarchical 
environment as being best for entry, consider regulations protecting property rights and protecting 
investors (another form of property protection). First, consider intellectual property. 
Strong patent protection could dissuade entry because it protects incumbents and forces 
new entrants to carve a wide path around existing intellectual property. On the other hand, new 
entrants do not have the organizational structure, finance, or intellectual capital to create a 
                                                 
37 The number of employees (in thousands) is measured using Compustat item 29. 
38 We have explored the use of other measures of labor intensity such as employees over total assets and get 
similar results.   28
significant first mover advantage and thus dissuade potential imitators. As a result, they might 
have a greater incentive to do research if they know their research will be protected legally.  
Following the now familiar method, our country level variable is Intellectual Property 
Rights, IntProp, which is a measure of the protection of intellectual property in a country.  This 
variable is estimated by the World Economic Forum (2002) and was used previously by 
Claessens and Laeven (2003).   
The industry variable measured from U.S. data, R&D, is a measure of dependence on 
research and development and equals the industry-level median of the ratio of research and 
development expenses to sales for Compustat firms in the same industry over the period 1990-
99.
39 The numerator and denominator are summed over all years for each firm before dividing.  
In Table 10 column (iii), we report regression estimates. The interaction variable is 
positive and significant suggesting there is more entry in R&D intensive industries in countries 
that protect intellectual property better. We find similar results when using a more general index 
of property rights from the Economic Freedom Index constructed by the Heritage Foundation (not 
shown). 
3.6.3 Access to Finance 
Let us turn next to access to finance. Evans and Jovanovic (1989) show theoretically that 
wealth constraints affect entrepreneurship, e.g., liquidity constraints hinder people from starting 
businesses.  This suggests that entry rates should be lower in countries with less developed 
financial systems.
40  In fact, Rajan and Zingales (2003a) suggest the absence of regulations 
protecting investors could be a very effective barrier to new firm creation. 
As our country measure, we use FinDev, which proxies for the depth of financial 
markets, and indirectly captures the regulations that promote financial development.  We use the 
sum of two measures:  First, as a measure of banking development we include the ratio of 
                                                 
39 We measure R&D using Compustat item 46, and sales using Compustat item 12. 
40 Rajan and Zingales (1998) find that there are more new establishments in industrial sectors with greater 
external financing needs in more developed financial systems.   29
domestic credit to the private sector to GDP from the International Monetary Fund’s International 
Financial Statistics (IMF-IFS).  Second, as a proxy for capital market development we use the 
ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP from the World Bank Development Indicators (WDI).  
Since the stock of credit and market capitalization only indirectly captures the effect of investor 
protection, as an alternative direct measure we use the Accounting Standards, AccStan, in a 
country. This is available for only a subset of countries in our data set and measures the number 
of items disclosed by the largest corporations in a country (see La Porta et al. (1998) for details). 
For the industry variable, External Financial Dependence, ExtFin, is a measure of 
dependence on external finance and equals the industry-level median of the ratio of capital 
expenditures minus cash flow over capital expenditures.  The numerator and denominator are 
summed over all years for each firm before dividing.  This variable measures the portion of 
capital expenditures not financed by internally generated cash.  Cash flow is defined as the sum 
of funds from operations, decreases in inventories, decreases in receivables, and increases in 
payables.  Capital expenditures include net acquisitions of fixed assets.
41  
In Table 10 columns (iv) and (v) we find as predicted that entry is higher in more 
financially intensive industries in countries that have higher financial development. We find 
similar results when using private credit to GDP or stock market development individually as 
measure of financial development (not shown).
42 
3.6.4 Human Capital 
Next, while we have just examined the effects of access to capital, one might also 
consider access to specialized human capital. In industries that need skilled human capital, there 
                                                 
41 Cash flow is calculated using Compustat item 110, if available, and otherwise by the sum of Compustat 
items 123, 125, 126, 106, 213, and 217, plus the change in working capital (the sum of Compustat items 
302, 303, and 304). Capital expenditure is calculated as the sum of Compustat items 128 (capital 
expenditure) and 129 (net acquisitions). 
42 For robustness, we replace FinDev with Trade Credit, the average ratio of accounts payable to total 
assets.  We find that industries with higher dependence on trade credit financing exhibit higher entry rates 
in countries with relatively weak financial institutions.  This finding is similar to Fisman and Love (2003) 
who use a similar methodology, but a different dataset for a larger number of countries, and find that 
industries with higher dependence on trade credit financing exhibit higher growth rates in countries with 
relatively weak financial institutions.   30
may be two ways of creating it. The first could be to train unskilled personnel in house. The 
second is to give them better general education so that they can be trained up quickly. Incumbent 
firms may have an advantage if much of the training has to be done in-house, while new entrants 
are better off if there is a wide pool of well-educated labor that can be brought up to speed 
quickly without prolonged on-the-job training. This implies that entry should be higher in 
industries that require high skills in countries with a better-educated work force. 
As our country variable, we use Edu, which measures the average schooling years in the 
total population of age 25 and above, and captures the regulations that promote education.  We 
use data for the year 1995 from Barro and Lee (2000), which is an update of the data and 
methodology developed in Barro and Lee (1996).   
As our industry variable, we include a measure of hourly US wage rates as a proxy for 
the required skill level in the industry. Wage is obtained from the Occupational Employment 
Statistics (OES) Survey, Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor.  This survey 
covers over 130 million employees in the U.S., and therefore includes employees at both small 
and large firms.  The wage rates are collected at the 3-digit SIC level and we convert them at the 
2-digit NACE code level. In Table 10 column (vi), we find that entry is indeed higher in high 
wage industries in countries that have a better educated work force, although the effect is not 
statistically significant.  
Finally, we have presented interactions one at a time thus far. Some of the interaction 
variables are strongly correlated (see Table 9) so it is hard to estimate their effect independently. 
Nevertheless, in Table 10 column (vii), we present a regression with all the interactions included 
(when we have used two proxies for an effect, we include the one that has the most data for this 
regression). We find that all variables retain their predicted effect and statistical significance 
except the financial sector interaction.    
3.6.5 Eurostat   31
Finally, we analyze “official” data from Eurostat, which is calculated by the European 
Union (EU) using confidential census data for a sample of 9 EU countries, by “EU-industries”, 
which are broader than 2-digit NACE codes.  We do not have data from this sample for non-EU, 
transition countries or for certain industries.  For example, whereas we calculate using the 
Amadeus database about 600 observations by country and 2-digit NACE industry codes, Eurostat 
only includes about 250 observations.  Eurostat provides entry rates, calculated as the one-year 
change in the number of firms, and exit rates, calculated as the number of firms exiting the 
industry, excluding mergers and acquisitions. 
Table 11, Panel A shows that our entry rates across countries and industries using the 
Amadeus database and Eurostat data are significantly correlated at about 67%.  In addition, both 
Amadeus and Eurostat entry rates are highly correlated with Eurostat exit rates.  This is consistent 
with Dunne, Roberts, and Samuelson (1988), who find a strong positive relationship between 
entry and exit rates across U.S. industries.  Panel B shows correlations by 2-digit industry code, 
averaged across countries.  We find that Eurostat entry rates are strongly significantly correlated 
at the industry-level with Amadeus entry rates and D&B U.S. entry rates at 90% and 60%, 
respectively.  This suggests that (i) our calculations using the Amadeus data are in line with 
official figures and (ii) industry-level entry rates are broadly similar in both Europe and the U.S.  
Table 12 shows that our main regression results are robust to the substitution of entry rates from 
Eurostat. 
IV. Conclusion 
  This paper uses cross-country data to identify the impact of regulations on entry with a 
view to determining what motives might prompt such regulation. We also examine other potential 
environmental factors that could affect entry. We use the Amadeus database, which includes 
financial data on over 3 million firms in Western and Eastern Europe.  This data improves upon 
previously used datasets in that it includes (1) a large number of private, unlisted and publicly 
traded corporations and (2) all sectors (it is not limited to manufacturing).  This database offers a   32
unique opportunity for us to construct entry rates across sectors and test the effect of diverse 
industry- and country-level characteristics on new firm creation. 
To summarize our results, we find that entry regulations hamper entry, especially in 
industries that naturally should have high entry. The value added by naturally “high-entry” 
industries grows more slowly in countries with high entry barriers. Entry regulations have these 
adverse effects primarily in countries that are less corrupt. Taken together, all this suggests entry 
regulations are neither benign nor welfare improving. We do not imply all regulations inhibit 
entry. In particular, regulations that enhance the enforcement of intellectual property rights or 
those that lead to a better developed financial sector do lead to greater entry in industries that do 
more R&D or industries that need more external finance.  
The plausible point is that one cannot make a blanket assertion that government 
intervention has a unidirectional effect on entry and growth. Regulations that protect intellectual 
property, promote schooling, and develop financial markets tend to have favorable effects while 
excessive bureaucratic regulation of entry tends to have adverse effects. Identifying the optimal 
degree of government intervention in regulating the environment in which firms operate, 
however, is a matter for further research.   33
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Amadeus industry-level variables 
 
 
Entry  Share of new firms in the total number of firms.  We define new firms as firms with age 1-
2.  Average for the years 1998-99.  We calculate this country-industry level variable for 2-
digit NACE industries.  Source: Amadeus. 
 
Entry > 10 employees only  Share of new firms in the total number of firms.  We define new firms as firms with age 1.  
Average for the years 1998-99.  We calculate this country-industry level variable for 2-digit 
NACE industries.  Source: Amadeus. 
 
Employment Creation  Share of employment of new firms in the employment of all firms.  We define new firms as 
firms with age 1-2.  Average for the years 1998-99.  We calculate this country-industry 
level variable for 2-digit NACE industries.  Source: Amadeus. 
 
Industry Share  Fraction of the industry’s sales in total sales.  Average for the years 1999-99.  We calculate 
this country-industry level variable for 2-digit NACE industries.  Source: Amadeus. 
 
Growth in value added per 
employee 
Growth in value added per employee over the period 1998-99 averaged over all incumbent 
firms in the industry in a country. Incumbent firms are defined as firms with age greater 
than 2. Value added is computed as Earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and 
amortization, plus labor costs. We calculate this country-industry level variable for 2-digit 
NACE industries. Source: Amadeus. 
 
Share in value added  Share of incumbent firms in the industry in overall value added for the country in 1999. 
Incumbent firms are defined as firms with age greater than 2. We calculate this country-
industry level variable for 2-digit NACE industries. Source: Amadeus. 
 
   
Eurostat industry-level variables 
 
 
Eurostat Entry  Entry rate for the year 1999 by Eurostat industry (based on 2-digit NACE industries).  
Source: Eurostat. 
 
Eurostat Exit  Exit rate for the year 1999 by Eurostat industry (based on 2-digit NACE industries).  
Source: Eurostat. 
 
U.S. Benchmark variables 
 
 
Total Assets (Scale)  Industry-level median of total assets. We compute this measure for all U.S. firms for the 
year 1995.  Calculated for 2-digit NACE industries (original data on a 4-digit SIC level). 
Source: Compustat. 
 
Total Revenues (Size)  Industry-level median of total revenues. We compute this measure for all U.S. firms for the 
year 1995.  Calculated for 2-digit NACE industries (original data on a 4-digit SIC level). 
Source: Compustat. 
 
4-firm concentration ratio (Conc)  Industry-level 4-firm concentration ratio, based on firm-level total revenues. We compute 
this measure for all U.S. firms for the year 1995.  Calculated for 2-digit NACE industries 
(original data on a 4-digit SIC level). Source: Compustat. 
 
Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HH)  Industry-level Herfindahl-Hirschman index, based on firm-level total revenues. We 
compute this measure for all U.S. firms for the year 1995.  Calculated for 2-digit NACE 
industries (original data on a 4-digit SIC level). Source: Compustat. 
 
External financial dependence 
(ExtFin) 
Measure of dependence on external finance, equal to the industry-level median of the ratio 
of capital expenditures minus cash flow over capital expenditures.  The numerator and 
denominator are summed over all years for each firm before dividing.  Cash flow is defined 
as the sum of funds from operations, decreases in inventories, decreases in receivables, and   37
increases in payables.  Capital expenditures include net acquisitions of fixed assets.  This 
definition follows Rajan and Zingales (1998).  We compute this measure for all U.S. firms 
for the period 1990-99.  Calculated for 2-digit NACE industries (original data on a 4-digit 
SIC level). Source: Compustat. 
 
R & D intensity (R&D)  Measure of dependence on research and development, equal to the industry-level median of 
the ratio of research and development expenses to sales.  The numerator and denominator 
are summed over all years for each firm before dividing.  We compute this measure for all 
U.S. firms for the period 1990-99.  Calculated for 2-digit NACE industries (original data on 
a 4-digit SIC level). Source: Compustat. 
 
Labor intensity (LabInt)  Measure of labor intensity, equal to the amount of employees per value added, industry 
medians of ratios over all firm-years in the relevant time period.  We compute this measure 
for all U.S. firms for the period 1990-99.  A higher score indicates higher labor intensity.  
Calculated for 2-digit NACE industries (original data on a 4-digit SIC level). Source: 
Compustat. 
 
Hourly wage rate (Wage)  Hourly wage rate, industry medians.  We compute this measure for all U.S. firms for the 
period 1999.  Calculated for 2-digit NACE industries (original data on a 3-digit SIC level).  
Source: Occupational Employment Statistics Survey, Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. 
Department of Labor.  Survey covers most firms and employees in the U.S.  
 
Entry U.S. (EntryUS)  Entry rates for U.S. corporations.  Calculated for 2-digit NACE industries (original data on 
a 4-digit SIC level). Average for the years 1998-99. Source: Dun & Bradstreet. 
 
Exit U.S. (Exit)  Exit rates for U.S. corporations.  Calculated for 2-digit NACE industries (original data on a 





Entry cost (EntCost)  Cost of business registration, expressed as a percentage of per capita GNP.  Data for the 
year 1999. Source: Djankov et al. (2002). 
 
Entry cost and time (EntTime)  Cost of business registration, including the monetized value of the entrepreneurs time. 
Source: Djankov et al. (2002). 
 
Entry procedures (EntProc)  Number of procedures to register a business.  Data for the year 1999.  Source: Djankov et 
al. (2002). 
 
Intellectual property rights 
(IntProp) 
Index of intellectual property rights for the year 2001. Source: World Economic Forum. 
 
Cost of dismissals (LabCost)  Sub-index of labor regulations capturing the costs of individual dismissals from Nicoletta et 
al. (2000) based on factor analysis of data in OECD (1999). Ranges from 0 to 6. A higher 
score indicates higher costs.  Data refer to 1998. 
 
Employment laws (EmpLaw)  Index of labor regulations from Botero et al. (2003).  Ranges from 0 to 3. A higher score 
indicates that regulation is more protective of a worker. Data refer to 1997. 
 
Private credit to GDP (Priv)  Ratio of domestic credit to the private sector scaled by GDP.  Source: International 
Monetary Fund’s International Financial Statistics (IMF-IFS). 
 
Stock market capitalization 
(MCap) 
Ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP.  Source: World Bank World Development 
Indicators (WDI). 
 
Financial Development (FinDev)  The sum of the private credit and market capitalization ratios. Source: IMF-IFS and WDI. 
 
Accounting standards (AccStan)  Measure of accounting standards. Score from 0 (low) to high (100). Source: LLSV (1998). 
Original source: International Accounting and Auditing Trends, Center for International 
Financial Analysis & Research, Inc. 
 
Human capital (Edu)  Measure of education attainment defined as the average years of schooling of population 
age over 25.  Source: Barro and Lee (1996, 2000). 
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 Table 1: Number of firms, corporations and employment, by country and year 
 
This table summarizes (i) the total number of firms, (ii) the total number of corporations (plc and ltd, or 
similar) and (iii) employment included in the Amadeus database.  We exclude about 25,000 firms with no 
financial data (i.e., inactive firms).  The total employment figures exclude firms with missing employment 
in all years.  We use current employment figures to replace lagged employment figures if previous year(s) 
employment are missing and to extrapolate forward employment figures if current year(s) employment is 
missing.  
 
  (i)   (ii)   (iii)  
  Total Firms  Total Corporations   Total Employment 
Country 1998  1999  1998  1999  1998  1999 
Austria 25,243  27,170  18,224  19,684  737,114  717,498 
Belgium 229,171  244,361  215,709  230,352  1,459,269  1,501,236 
Bulgaria 28,272  38,840  17,004  21,167  1,113,907  1,116,755 
Czech Republic  7,153  7,613 7,153  7,613 1,424,975 1,472,515 
Denmark 72,989  82,639  68,906  77,720  902,078  961,128 
Estonia 10,438  27,407  10,243  26,737  269,042  321,308 
Finland 47,646  57,781  46,286  55,765  789,208  867,984 
France 652,376  676,781  584,274  604,155  7,640,624  7,724,623 
Germany 468,865  519,759  334,305  372,167  10,266,932  10,005,253
Greece 17,617  18,604  17,297 18,280 708,412 710,973 
Hungary 29,397  17,404  25,731  15,794  854,131  751,858 
Ireland 15,184  10,587  13,835  9,759  104,543  78,324 
Italy 117,670  126,514  111,736  120,393  4,598,602  4,808,664 
Latvia 2,433  2,681  2,244  2,482  226,195  232,865 
Lithuania 1,123  1,247  1,113  1,228  180,049  144,779 
Netherlands 145,634  153,430  145,454  153,276  587,366  581,869 
Norway 104,836  115,804  104,836  115,804  991,191  1,059,226 
Poland 10,605  10,309  8,668  8,451  2,667,816  2,423,589 
Portugal 21,351  23,798  20,734  23,096  396,088  195,393 
Romania 302,705  318,020  287,657  303,374  4,027,310  3,506,044 
Spain 166,688  180,621  164,879  178,662  4,849,609  4,894,020 
Sweden 193,333  204,936  193,333  204,936  1,931,973  2,022,113 
UK 506,610  863,498  491,891  833,033  10,712,104  10,545,236
Total 3,218,450  3,770,760 2,896,065 3,408,713  58,289,265  57,511,010
 
   39
Table 2: Comparison with National Statistics 
 
This table compares the number of corporations in Amadeus in 1999 with the total number of firms 
according to 1996 data from Enterprises in Europe: 6
th report (Eurostat, 2003).  The Amadeus ratios are 
calculated using our extrapolated employment data and the number of corporations (PLCs and LTDs).  The 
national data includes all enterprises, including proprietorships.  Enterprises with 0 employees are excluded 
from both samples.  Enterprises in Europe only includes EU-countries, which excludes Eastern European 
countries, Norway, and Switzerland.  Columns (i-ii) indicate the coverage in Amadeus of large firms.  
Column (i) is equal to the ratio of total firms with more than 250 employees in Amadeus to total firms with 
more than 250 employees in national statistics.  Column (ii) is equal to the ratio of total employment of 
firms with more than 250 employees in Amadeus to total employment at firms with more than 250 
employees in national statistics.  Columns (iii-iv) indicate the coverage in Amadeus of small firms.   
Column (i) is equal to the ratio of total firms with more than 10-50 employees in Amadeus to total firms 
with 10-50 employees in national statistics.  Column (ii) is equal to the ratio of total employment of firms 
with 10-50 employees in Amadeus to total employment at firms with more than 10-50 employees in 
national statistics.  Column (v) indicates whether there is a bias in the relative coverage of large (versus 
small) firms in Amadeus.  Column (v) is equal to the absolute value of the difference between the ratio of 
employment in firms with 10-50 employees to employment in firms with more than 250 employees in 
Amadeus and the ratio of employment in firms with 10-50 employees to employment in firms with more 
than 250 employees in national statistics.  All data is shown as percentages.  Because of reported data 
availability, statistics for large firms in Iceland is measured as firms with more than 100 (rather than 250) 
employees. 
 
 (i)  (ii)  (iii)  (iv)  (v) 
 
Coverage of large firms by  
number of: 
 
Coverage of Small Firms by  
number of: 
 




Austria 44.4%  38.7%  54.6% 65.2%  10.6% 
Belgium 70.0% 57.4%  65.9%  50.6%  15.3% 
Denmark 100.0%  77.2% 63.3%  73.1% 9.8% 
Finland 125.0%  90.2%  39.0%  42.4%  3.4% 
France 65.2%  54.2%  66.8%  57.8%  9.0% 
Germany 34.3%  39.0%  47.4% 49.5%  2.1% 
Greece 200.0%  84.4%  58.0% 97.7%  39.7% 
Iceland 30.0%  39.3%  6.2%  37.9%  31.7% 
Ireland 33.3%  14.8%  23.1%  67.9%  44.8% 
Italy 57.9%  78.5%  45.3%  100.0%  54.7% 
Luxembourg 40.0%  38.3%  2.9%  82.2%  79.3% 
Netherlands 14.3%  11.9%  31.5%  46.4%  14.9% 
Portugal 33.3% 20.5%  12.8%  117.5%  104.7% 
Spain 83.3%  98.6%  53.2%  99.0%  45.8% 
Sweden 114.3%  105.6%  43.7%  47.8%  4.1% 
UK 85.1%  79.4%  8.6%  31.0%  22.4% 
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Table 3:  Entry rates, by country, average 1998-99 
 
This table shows entry rates of new firms in Amadeus, averaged by country across industries for the period 
1998-99.  Columns (i-ii) include all firms and Columns (iii-iv) exclude firms with less than 10 employees. 
We report both the percentage of new firms and employment at new firms.  Note that the sample sizes 
differ because some firms are missing employment data, i.e. Columns (i-ii) include all firms that include 
age, even if employment is missing.  We exclude the agricultural, mining, utility, finance, and public 
sectors.  We exclude country-industry observations based on less than 3 firm observations.  New firms are 
defined as corporations of age 1 and 2.  Columns (v-vi) shows the number of entry procedures and entry 
costs as a percentage of per capita GNP, respectively (Djankov, et al. 2002).  All data are shown as 
percentages.   
 
 
 (i)  (ii)  (iii)  (iv)  (v)  (vi) 
  All firms:  Firms with more than 10 employees:    
Country  % of new firms 
 
% of  employment 
at new firms 
% of new 
firms 
% of  employment at 
new firms 
Number of entry 
procedures 
Entry cost (% of per 
capita GNP) 
Austria 13.00  11.78  12.20  12.55  9  27.28 
Belgium 11.58  4.08  5.37  3.40  8  9.98 
Bulgaria 8.60  2.05  5.34  2.49  10  14.41 
Czech Republic  11.55  7.15 10.05  7.71 10  8.22 
Denmark 13.66  5.36  8.26  4.60  3  10.00 
Estonia 20.41  11.95  14.17  11.00  n.a.  n.a. 
Finland 11.13  6.78  6.15  6.41  5  1.16 
France 14.68  5.55  7.20  4.39  15  14.30 
Germany 12.34  7.88  7.78  7.65  10  15.69 
Greece 15.44  8.17  11.45 8.06  15  58.60 
Hungary 17.38  5.41  13.20  5.57  8  85.87 
Italy 3.46  2.59  2.10  2.61  16  20.02 
Latvia 18.16  10.53  16.20  10.57  7  42.34 
Lithuania 19.23  9.16  18.30  10.18  10  5.46 
Netherlands 8.48  5.90  6.04  7.29 8  18.41 
Norway 16.87  14.13  12.39  13.90  4  4.72 
Poland 12.04  6.28  10.69  6.22  11  25.46 
Romania 17.97  13.51  11.76  13.25  16  15.31 
Spain 11.41  6.03  7.49  5.56  11  17.30 
Sweden 7.90  3.49  5.32  3.05  6  2.56 
UK 15.01  5.17  6.28  5.05  5  1.43 
Averages:            
  Western Europe   11.92  6.69  7.54  6.50  8.85  15.50 
  Transition countries   15.67  8.26  12.46  8.37  10.29  28.15 
     All countries  13.35  7.28  9.42  7.21  9.35  19.93 
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Table 4:  Entry rates across Europe and the U.S., by 2-digit NACE code 
 
This table shows entry rates of new firms across Europe and the U.S. by 2-digit NACE code groups. In 
columns (ii-vi), European data are from Amadeus, averaged across countries, and averaged for the years 
1998-99. Columns (ii-v) define new firms as corporations of age 1 and 2 and column (vi) defines new firms 
as corporations age 1, to compare to the U.S. data. In column (vii), data on U.S. entry rates are from Dunn 
& Bradstreet, averaged for the years 1998-99, and new firms are defined as corporations of age 1. Data are 
shown as percentages.  We exclude the agricultural, mining, utility, finance, and public sectors (NACE 
codes 5-7, 10-14, 50-51, 65-67, 85, and 91-92).  We also exclude country-industry observations based on 
less than 3 firm observations.  “Total” is the average of all non-excluded 2-digit NACE codes. 
 
 (i)  (ii)  (iii)  (iv)  (v)  (vi)  (vii) 
   Europe  U.S. 
    Age 1 and 2  Age 1 
   All  Firms:  Firms with more 


















Manufacturing  15 – 36  11.07  6.24  8.26  6.37  6.00  6.31 
- Manufacture of   
   chemicals  24 9.53  3.60  6.34  3.49  4.64  6.08 
- Manufacture of office        
  machinery and computers  30 15.53  8.49  11.06  8.24 9.33 8.67 
- Manufacture of radio,  
   television, and    
   communication equipment  
32 14.35  8.65  11.41  8.37 7.14 8.45 
Construction 
  45 13.56  7.18  7.88  6.30 6.51 8.14 
Trade 
  50 – 52  14.27  8.24  8.69  7.43  6.92  5.86 
Hotels and Restaurants 
  55 14.73  8.15  10.93  7.40 7.42 5.95 
Transportation 
  60 – 63  13.90  6.21  9.19  6.26  7.58  6.74 
Communications 
  64 26.71  15.34  21.11  16.03  14.00  10.09 
Services  70 – 74, 
93  18.01 10.15 11.18 9.36  9.77  7.51 
- Computer services  72  22.19  10.99  13.23  9.80  12.49  10.73 
             
Total  15 – 93  13.27  7.33  9.22  7.19  7.09  6.65 
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Table 5: Size Distribution of New firms in Europe,  
by country and firm size, average of 1998 and 1999 
 
This table shows the average shares of new firms in Amadeus, by firm size and country, averaged over the 
period 1998-99.  New firms are defined as corporations with age 1 or 2.  Data are shown as percentages of 
total new corporations. 
 
 (i)  (ii)  (iii)  (iv) 
  Percentage of new corporations with employment: 
 
Country  < 10  10-50  50-250  > 250 
Austria 61.32  29.89  7.04  1.76 
Belgium 91.18  7.44  1.17  0.20 
Bulgaria 54.51  24.10  16.64  4.75 
Czech Republic  28.18 34.83 29.39 7.60 
Denmark 82.57  15.42  1.74  0.27 
Estonia 77.39  19.36  2.72  0.53 
Finland 87.37  9.70  2.30  0.63 
France 90.91  8.00  0.93  0.16 
Germany 80.50  16.05  2.71  0.74 
Greece 54.54  40.42 4.49 0.54 
Hungary 43.03  38.90  14.83  3.24 
Ireland 7.89  34.54  52.30  0.00 
Italy 66.18  23.21  8.35  2.25 
Latvia 50.02  31.37  14.80  3.81 
Lithuania 36.38  47.04  12.79  3.78 
Netherlands 57.67  23.15  16.33  2.85 
Norway 86.42  11.68  1.55  0.36 
Poland 19.50  28.42  41.87  10.20 
Portugal 50.87  28.35  16.50  4.28 
Romania 92.07  6.02  1.44  0.46 
Spain 68.06  27.54  3.82  0.58 
Sweden 91.32  7.54  0.98  0.17 
United Kingdom  70.14  17.18  9.83  2.85 
Averages:        
  Western Europe   69.80 20.01  8.67  1.18 
  Transition countries   50.14 28.76 16.81 4.30 
     All countries  62.96 23.05 11.50 2.26 
 
 
    43
Table 6A:  Determinants of Entry Rates 
 
This table shows Tobit regressions with censoring at 0 and 1, an OLS regression, and a weighted least squares regression. The dependent variable in columns (i-
vii) is the ratio of new firms (defined as age 1- 2) to total firms, averaged over the period 1998-99, by 2-digit NACE industry code and country (Amadeus). 
Industry Share is the industry share in sales (Amadeus). EntryUS is the ratio of new firms to total firms in the U.S., by 2-digit NACE industry code (Dunn & 
Bradstreet). Columns (i) shows a Tobit regression that interacts EntryUS with country-level entry costs (Djankov, et al, 2002). Column (ii-iii) shows a Tobit 
regression that interacts EntryUS with  the number of entry procedures and the monetized value of the entrepreneur’s time in the entry cost variable, respectively 
(Djankov, et al, 2002). Column (iv) shows a Tobit regression that excludes transition countries. Column (v) includes shows a Tobit regression that only firms 
with more than 10 employees, excluding industries with less than 50% of firm coverage for employment.  Column (vi) shows OLS regression results and Column 
(vii) reports weighted least squares (WLS) estimates with weights based on the logarithm of the number of firms in that industry with nonmissing age data.  The 
dependent variable in column (viii) is the ratio of employment at new firms (defined as age 1- 2), averaged over the period 1998-99, by 2-digit NACE industry 
code and country. This ratio is calculated excluding large new firms (defined as employment greater than 250). We also exclude industries with less than 50% of 
firm coverage for employment. All regressions include a constant, country dummies and 2-digit industry dummies, not shown. Standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significant at 10%,  5%, and  1%, respectively. See Appendix 1 for complete variable definitions and sources.   
 
 
 (i)  (ii)  (iii)  (iv)  (v)  (vi)  (vii)  (viii) 
  Fraction of new firms  Fraction of employment 
at new firms 











OLS  Weighted 
least squares  Tobit 
                
Industry Share  -0.092  -0.093  -0.095 0.157  -0.224* -0.092  -0.041  -0.131 
 (0.108)  (0.109)  (0.108)  (0.123)  (0.122)  (0.091)  (0.076)  (0.101) 
EntryUS * EntCost  -0.175***     -0.110***  -0.237**  -0.175*** -0.201***  -0.089 
 (0.047)     (0.041)  (0.110)  (0.066)  (0.063)  (0.089) 
EntryUS * EntProc    -0.656***             
   (0.177)           
EntryUS * EntCost&Time      -0.211***         
      (0.055)         
                
                
Observations 708  708  708  484  591  708 708  602 
R-squared -  -  -  -  -  0.59  0.65  -   44
Table 6B:  Determinants of Entry Rates: Alternative Proxies for Natural Propensity to Enter 
 
This table shows Tobit regressions with censoring at 0 and 1. The dependent variable in all columns is the ratio of new firms (defined as age 1- 2) to total firms, 
averaged over the period 1998-99, by 2-digit NACE industry code and country (Amadeus). Industry Share is the industry share in sales (Amadeus). EntCost is 
country-level entry costs (Djankov, et al, 2002). Columns (i-ii) interacts EntCost with the percentage of U.S. firms that exited and the percentage of U.S. firms 
defined as SMEs (with less than 250 employees), respectively, averaged over the period 1998-99, by 2-digit NACE industry code (Dunn & Bradstreet). Columns 
(iii-iv) examines market size and interact EntCost with medium assets and sales, respectively, of U.S. firms, averaged over the period 1998-99, by 2-digit NACE 
industry code (Compustat). Columns (v-vi) examine market concentration and interact EntCost with  the concentration ratio of sales at the largest 4 firms 
(measured by total sales) and by the Herfindahl-Hirschman index, averaged over the period 1998-99, by  2-digit NACE industry code (Compustat). All 
regressions include a constant, country dummies and 2-digit industry dummies, not shown. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote 
significant at 10%,  5%, and  1%, respectively. See Appendix 1 for complete variable definitions and sources.  
 
  (i)  (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) 
        
 Exit  SME  Scale  Size  Conc4  HH 
        
Industry Share  -0.081  -0.083  -0.087 -0.088 -0.085 -0.085 
  (0.109) (0.109) (0.109) (0.109) (0.109) (0.109) 
Exit * EntCost  -0.032**           
  (0.015)       
SME * EntCost    -0.007*         
   (0.004)        
Scale  *  EntCost     0.002***     
     (0.001)     
Size * EntCost      0.002***    
      (0.001)    
Conc * EntCost       0.004   
       (0.003)   
HH * EntCost        0.002 
        (0.001) 
        
        
Observations  708 708 708 708  708  708   45
Table 7: Determinants of industry performance and size 
This table shows Tobit regressions with censoring at 0 and 1.  The dependent variable in columns (i) to (viii) is the industry-level growth in value added per 
employee at firms with age >2 (i.e. excluding new firms). Columns (i-iv) estimate a Tobit regression, columns (v-viii) show IV estimations, and column (ix) 
shows a Tobit estimation. We use the legal origin variable in LSSV (1998) as instrument for entry regulation. The dependent variable in column (ix) is the 
industry-level share in value added. All dependent variables are calculated using data for the year 1999, by 2-digit NACE industry code and country, and 
excluding observations based on less than 3 firms. Growth observations are left-censored at -50% and right-censored at >100%. Share in value added 
observations are left-censored at 0% and right-censored at 100%.  Industry Share is the industry share in sales (Amadeus). EntCost is country-level entry costs 
(Djankov, et al, 2002). Columns (i-ii) and (v-vi) interact EntCost with the percentage of U.S. firms that entered and the percentage of U.S. firms defined as SMEs 
(with less than 250 employees), respectively, averaged over the period 1998-99, by 2-digit NACE industry code (Dunn & Bradstreet). Columns (iii-iv) and (vii-
viii) interact EntCost with medium assets and sales, respectively, of U.S. firms, averaged over the period 1998-99, by 2-digit NACE industry code (Compustat). 
All regressions include a constant, country dummies and 2-digit industry dummies, not shown. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote 
significant at 10%,  5%, and  1%, respectively. See Appendix 1 for complete variable definitions and sources.   
 
  (i)  (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)  (vii)  (viii)  (ix) 
  Growth in value added per employee  Share in value added 
 Tobit  Estimation:  IV  Estimation:   
Industry  Share  -0.050 -0.030 -0.048 -0.040 -0.178 -0.165 -0.173 -0.166   
  (0.530) (0.529) (0.530) (0.530) (0.378) (0.378) (0.376) (0.378)   
Entry  *  EntCost -0.426**       -0.211*       -0.006 
  (0.202)      (0.113)       (0.018) 
SME * EntCost    -0.039**        -0.026***       
   (0.015)      (0.001)      
Scale  *  EntCost     0.006**       0.006***     
     (0.003)      (0.001)    
Size * EntCost      0.007**      0.006***  
      (0.003)      (0.001)  
Observations  572 572 572 572 558 558  558  558 596 
R-squared  - - - -  0.18  0.18  0.18  0.18 -   46
Table 8: Selection issues 
 
This table shows instrumental variable regressions with robust errors and Tobit regressions with censoring at 0 and 1. The dependent variable is the ratio of new 
firms (defined as age 1- 2) to total firms, averaged over the period 1998-99, by 2-digit NACE industry code and country. Columns (i-v) show instrumental 
variable regressions. We use the legal origin variable in LSSV (1998) as instrument for entry regulations. We use clustering to correct the standard errors for the 
fact that the country level variables are instrumented. Columns (vi-vii) show Tobit results when we estimate different slopes for the interaction variables for 
whether the industry is in a country below or above the sample-median per capita income (low GDP per capita and high GDP per capita, respectively), or above 
or below sample-median level of corruption (high corruption and low corruption, respectively). All regressions include a constant, country dummies and 2-digit 
industry dummies, not shown. See Table 6 and Appendix 1 for complete variable definitions and sources. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and 
*** denote significant at 10%,  5%, and  1%, respectively. 
 
 (i)  (ii)  (iii)  (iv)  (v)  (vi)  (vii) 
  Instrumental variables  Different slopes 
Industry  Share  -0.092 -0.087 -0.088 -0.085 -0.085  -0.110  -0.117 
  (0.090) (0.093) (0.092) (0.094) (0.093)  (0.108)  (0.108) 
EntryUS  *  EntCost  -0.175***          
  (0.055)          
Scale  *  EntCost    0.002***         
    (0.000)         
Size  *  EntCost     0.002***        
     (0.001)        
Conc * EntCost        0.004*       
      (0.002)       
HH  *  EntCost       0.002***     
       (0.000)     
Low GDP per capita * EntryUS * EntryCost            0.087   
        ( 0 . 1 2 7 )    
High GDP per capita * EntryUS * EntryCost            -0.170***   
        ( 0 . 0 4 7 )    
High  corruption  *  EntryUS  *  EntryCost          0.186 
          ( 0 . 1 2 8 )  
Low  Corruption  *  EntryUS  *  EntryCost          -0.168*** 
          ( 0 . 0 4 7 )  
           
Observations  708 708 708 708 708  708  708 
R-squared  0.59 0.59 0.59 0.58 0.58  -  - 
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Table 9:  Summary statistics and correlations of variables 
 
Panel A: Summary statistics of country-level variables 
 
This table shows summary statistics of country-level variables. See Appendix 1 for complete variable definitions and sources. 
 
 (i)  (ii)  (iii)  (iv)  (v)  (vi) 
Variable  Number of 
countries  Mean Median  Std.  Dev. Min  Max 
            
Entry cost 
  (EntryCost) 
 
20 0.20  0.15  0.21  0.01  0.86 
Cost of labor dismissals 
  (LabCost) 
 
16 1.92  1.90  0.93  0.50  4.20 
Employment laws 
  (EmpLaw) 
 
20 1.55  1.68  0.36  0.80  2.18 
Intellectual property rights    
  (IntProp) 
 
21 5.00  5.30  1.27  2.90  6.60 
Financial development 
  (FinDev) 
 
21 1.07  0.96  0.75  0.11  2.79 
Accounting 
  (AccStan) 
 
13 0.67  0.64  0.09  0.54  0.83 
Human capital 
  (Edu)  21 8.82  9.24  1.17  6.09  10.85 
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Panel B:  Summary statistics of U.S. industry-level variables, by industry 
 
This table shows summary statistics of U.S. industry-level characteristics.  The variables are calculated using the Dunn & Bradstreet databases of U.S. 
corporations and the CompuStat database of U.S. listed firms. See Appendix 1 for complete variable definitions and sources.  Averages are reported across sector 
groups based on 2-digit NACE industry codes.  See Annex 3 for complete 2-digit NACE U.S. entry and exit rates. We exclude the agricultural, mining, utility, 
finance, and public sectors and 2-digit industries with less than 3 observations. 
 
 (i)  (ii)  (iii)  (iv)  (v)  (vi)  (vii)  (viii)  (ix)  (x)  (xi)  (xii) 




































Manufacturing  1  15 – 36  6.31  21.71  318.44  385.41  0.44  0.083  23.94  3.15  26.60  13.96 
- Manufacture of chemicals    24  6.08  22.43  31.04  17.22  0.23  0.025  11.12  12.68  79.05  16.18 
- Manufacture of office        
  machinery and computers    30  8.67 34.23  34.65  40.23 0.52  0.088 54.31  10.35  50.15  22.33 
- Manufacture of radio, 
  television, and 
  communication equipment  
  32  8.45 27.43  42.95  51.69 0.47  0.073 19.61  10.62  32.76  13.67 
Construction 2  45  8.14  19.89  97.24  127.54  0.34  0.051  22.27  0.50  46.98  15.42 
Trade  3  50 – 52  5.86  20.30  104.70  209.29  0.38  0.077  43.56  0.00  54.79  11.00 
Hotels and Restaurants  4  55  5.95  15.88  52.82  62.65  0.41  0.057  95.70  0.00  42.51  7.28 
Transportation  5  60 – 63  6.74  24.63  218.34  204.39  0.51  0.104  20.13  7.50  13.01  14.57 
Communications  6  64  10.09 31.36  270.85  108.67 0.30  0.036  9.63 2.23  85.58  19.95 
Services  7  70 – 74, 93  7.51  20.30  47.76  46.17  0.50  0.107  28.68  10.21  96.87  15.36 
- Computer services    72  10.73  25.61  17.85  20.95  0.61  0.135  22.81  17.57  123.86  23.54 
                       
Total 1-7  15-93  6.65  21.74  234.23  276.32  0.45  0.086  28.03  4.12  41.00  14.00 
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Panel C:  Correlation of U.S. industry-level variables, by 2-digit NACE code  
 
This table shows correlations and significance levels between U.S. industry characteristics.  See Appendix 1 for variable definitions and sources.  ***, ** and * 
asterisk indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significance, respectively. 
 
   EntryUS  R&D  ExtFin  LabInt  Wage 
R&D  0.2278      
    (0.1815)      
ExtFin 0.2456  0.8011***       
 (0.1372)  (0.0000)       
LabInt 0.0345  -0.1502  0.1208     
 (0.8540)  (0.4283)  (0.5173)     
Wage 0.2730  0.4178**  0.3557**  -0.3734**   
    (0.1021) (0.0125) (0.0307) (0.0421)   
ExitUS 0.5195***  0.0144  -0.0151  -0.2535  0.3667** 
    (0.0008) (0.9335) (0.9284) (0.1688) (0.0256) 
 
Panel D:  Correlation matrix of interaction variables, by 2-digit NACE code and country 
 
This table shows correlations and significance levels of the main regression interaction variables.  See Appendix 1 for variable definitions and sources.  ** and * 
asterisk indicate 1% and 5% significance, respectively. 
 
  LabInt * LabCost  LabInt * EmplLaw R&D * IntProp  ExtFin * FinDev  Wage * Edu 
LabInt * EmplLaw  0.6511***        
  (0.0000)        
R&D * IntProp  0.0527 0.0676*       
  (0.2089) (0.0737)       
ExtFin * FinDev  -0.0108 0.0659*  0.6990***     
  (0.7913) (0.0742) (0.0000)     
Wage * Edu  -0.2978*** -0.3110*** 0.3644***  0.2181***   
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)   
EntryUS * EntCost  0.3105*** 0.1155*** -0.1495***  -0.2945***  -0.2363*** 
  (0.0000) (0.0017) (0.0001) (0.0000)  (0.0000)   50
Table 10: Other Regulations and the Business Environment 
 
This table shows Tobit regressions with censoring at 0 and 1. The dependent variable is the ratio of new firms (defined as age 1- 2) to total firms, averaged over 
the period 1998-99, by 2-digit NACE industry code and country. All regressions include a constant, country dummies and 2-digit industry dummies, not shown. 
See Appendix 1 for complete variable definitions and sources. Industry Share is the industry share in sales. LabInt * LabCost is the interaction of industry-level 
labor intensity and country-level cost of labor dismissals. LabInt * EmplLaw is the interaction of industry-level labor intensity and country-level employment 
laws index. R&D * IntProp is the interaction of industry-level R&D intensity and country-level Intellectual property rights. ExtFin * FinDev is the interaction of 
industry-level external financial dependence and country-level financial development. ExtFin * Account is the interaction of industry-level external financial 
dependence and country-level accounting standards. Wage * Edu is the interaction of industry-level hourly wages and country-level human capital. EntryUS * 
EntCost is the interaction of industry-level new entry ratios and country-level entry costs. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote 
significant at 10%,  5%, and  1%, respectively. 
 
  (i)  (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)  (vii) 
Industry Share  -0.007  -0.097  -0.070 -0.059 0.168 -0.029 -0.158 
  (0.118) (0.109) (0.109) (0.109) (0.123) (0.109) (0.107) 
LabInt  *  LabCost  -1.297***        
  (0.328)        
LabInt * EmplLaw    -1.886*          -3.011*** 
   (1.012)        (1.075) 
R&D * IntProp      0.097***        0.088*** 
     (0.022)      (0.027) 
ExtFin * FinDev        0.020***      0.004 
      (0.005)     (0.006) 
ExtFin * AccStan          0.099**     
         (0.039)    
Wage * Edu        0.372  0.280 
        (0.370)  (0.377) 
EntryUS * EntCost         -0.166***
         (0.053) 
         
Observations  587 708 713 744 484 724 660 
R-squared 0.63  0.58  0.60  0.59  0.69  0.59  0.61 
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Table 11: Comparison between Amadeus data and Eurostat data 
 
Amadeus Entry is the ratio of new firms defined as age 1-2 to total firms, averaged over the period 1998-99, by Eurostat industry code and country, computed 
using Amadeus data. Eurostat Entry is the ratio of new firms to total firms for the year 1999, computed by Eurostat industry code and country. EuroStat Exit is 
the exit rate for the year 1999 by Eurostat industry code and country, defined as the number of exited firms, correcting for mergers and acquisitions. D&B Entry 
is the entry rate in the U.S. in 1999 and D&B Exit is the ratio of exited firms in the U.S. in 1999. Panel A uses 220 observations and Panel B  uses 30 
observations. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significant at 10%,  5%, and  1%, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Correlations at country-industry level 
 
 Amadeus  Eurostat  Eurostat 
 Entry  Entry    Exit 
1     Amadeus 
Entry     
Eurostat ***0.6716  1   
Entry (0.0000)     
Eurostat ***0.5311  ***0.6373  1 
Exit (0.0000)  (0.0000)   
 
 
Panel B: Correlations at 2-digit Eurostat industry-level  
 
 Amadeus  Eurostat  Eurostat  D&B  D&B 
 Entry  Entry  Exit  EntryUS  ExitUS 
Amadeus  1      
Entry       
Eurostat  ***0.8991  1     
Entry  (0.0000)      
Eurostat ***0.7048  ***0.8332 1     
Exit  (0.0000)  (0.0000)     
D&B ***0.6035  ***0.6767  ***0.6431  1   
EntryUS  (0.0004) (0.0000) (0.0000)     
D&B 0.2812  **0.3903  ***0.5013  ***0.5133  1 
ExitUS  (0.1323) (0.0330) (0.0048) (0.0037)     52
Table 12:  Determinants of Entry Rates: Eurostat data 
 
This table shows Tobit regressions with censoring at 0 and 1.  The dependent variable in columns (i-iii) is the entry rate for the year 1999 by Eurostat industry 
code and country, defined as the number of new firms divided by the total number of firms. EntryUS* EntCost is the interaction of industry-level new entry 
ratios and the logarithm of country-level entry costs. Scale * EntCost is the interaction of the logarithm of the median industry total assets and the logarithm of 
country-level entry costs. Conc * EntCost is the interaction of the logarithm of the industry-level 4-firm concentration ratio (in terms of total revenues) times the 
logarithm of country-level entry costs. The dependent variable in column (iv) is the exit rate for the year 1999 by Eurostat industry code and country, defined as 
the number of exited firms, correcting for mergers and acquisitions. Column (v) reports instrumental variables regressions with the dependent variable equal to 
Entry rates calculated by Eurostat and using legal origins as the instrument for entry cost. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. All regressions include a 
constant, country dummies and industry dummies, not shown. See Appendix 1 for complete variable definitions and sources. *, **, and *** denote significant at 
10%,  5%, and  1%, respectively. 
 
 (i)  (ii)  (iii)  (iv)  (v) 
  Tobit Regressions:  Instrumental variables: 
         
 EntryEuro  EntryEuro  EntryEuro  ExitEuro  EntryEuro 
         
EntryUS * EntCost  -0.198***      -0.128***  -0.235*** 
 (0.043)      (0.027)  (0.065) 
Scale * EntCost    0.002***       
   (0.001)       
Conc * EntCost     0.003    
     (0.002)    
Observations 259  259  259  234  259 
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Figure 1: Difference-in-difference estimates by ordered industries. 
 
This figure presents difference-in-difference (DD) estimates by NACE industry, where the industries are ranked from lowest natural entry (EntryUS) to highest. 
DD is calculated as follows. We first divide the countries into two groups: High entry regulation (HR) and low entry regulation (LR) – depending on whether the 
country’s entry costs (EntCost) is above or below the sample median – and then rank the industries from the lowest natural entry to the highest. Next, we pick the 
lowest natural entry industry (LWE) as our reference industry, and compute the difference-in-difference estimate: DD = [J(HR) – LWE(HR)] – [(J(LR) – 
LWE(LR)], for each remaining industry J. The benchmark industry is manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c. (NACE 29), for which EntryUS takes a low 
of 4.30 percent. We plot DD against the ordered industries. We also display the regression line of an OLS regression of DD on EntryUS. See Annex 1 for the 
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Figure 2: Difference-in-difference estimates by ordered countries. 
 
This figure presents difference-in-difference (DD) estimates by country, where the countries are ranked from lowest entry regulation (EntCost) to highest. DD is 
calculated as follows. We first divide the industries into two groups: Low entry (LE) and High entry (HE) – depending on whether the industry’s U.S. entry rates 
(EntryUS) is below or above the sample median – and then order the countries from the highest entry regulation to the lowest. Next, we pick the country with 
highest entry regulation (HER) as our reference country, and compute the difference-in-difference estimate: DD = [J(LE) – HER(LE)] – [(J(HE) – HER(HE)], for 
each remaining country J. The benchmark country is Hungary, for which EntCost takes a high of –0.15. We plot DD against the ordered countries. We also 
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Annex 1: 2-digit level industry codes according to NACE industrial classification Rev. 1. 
 
NACE code  Industry name 
01  Agriculture, hunting and related service activities 
02  Forestry, logging and related services activities 
05  Fishing, operation of fish hatcheries and fish farms; service activities incidental to fishing 
10  Mining of coal and lignite; extraction of peat 
11  Extraction of crude petroleum and natural gas 
12  Mining of uranium and thorium ores 
13  Mining of metal ores 
14  Other mining and quarrying 
15  Manufacture of food products and beverages 
16  Manufacture of tobacco products 
17  Manufacture of textiles 
18  Manufacture of wearing apparel; dressing and dyeing of fur 
19  Manufacture of luggage, handbags, saddlery and footwear 
20  Manufacture of wood and of products of wood and cork, except furniture 
21  Manufacture of pulp, paper and paper products 
22  Publishing, printing and reproduction of recorded media 
23  Manufacture of coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel 
24  Manufacture of chemicals, and chemical products 
25  Manufacture of rubber and plastic products 
26  Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products 
27  Manufacture of basic metals 
28  Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment 
29  Manufacture of machinery and equipment not elsewhere classified 
30  Manufacture of office machinery and computers 
31  Manufacture of electrical machinery and apparatus not elsewhere classified 
32  Manufacture of radio, television and communication equipment and apparatus 
33  Manufacture of medical, precision and optical instruments, watches and clocks 
34  Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 
35  Manufacture of other transport equipment 
36  Manufacture of furniture; manufacturing not elsewhere classified 
37 Recycling 
40  Electricity, gas, steam and hot water supply 
41 Collection,  purification  and distribution of water 
45 Construction 
50  Sale, maintenance and repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles; retail sale of automotive fuel 
51  Wholesale trade and commission trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles 
52  Retail trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles 
55  Hotels and restaurants 
60  Land transport; transport via pipelines 
61 Water  transport 
62 Air  transport 
63  Supporting and auxiliary transport activities; activities of travel agencies 
64  Post and telecommunications 
65  Financial intermediation, except insurance and pension funding 
66  Insurance and pension funding, except compulsory social security 
67  Activities auxiliary to financial intermediation 
70 Real  estate  activities 
71  Renting of machinery and equipment without operator and of personal and household goods 
72  Computer and related activities 
73  Research and development 
74  Other business activities 
75  Public administration and defense; compulsory social security 
80 Education 
85  Health and social work 
90  Sewage and refuse disposal, sanitation and similar activities 
91  Activities of membership organization not elsewhere classified 
92  Recreational, cultural and sporting activities 
93  Other services activities 
95  Private household with employed persons 
99  Extra-territorial organizations and bodies   56
Annex 2: Details about collection of company accounts in Amadeus 
 
Country  Which companies have to file accounts?  Are all public and 
private limited 
companies 
required to file 
accounts ? 
What is the 
maximum period a 
company can take 
to file its accounts 
after its year end ? 
What is the 
maximum period 
between a 
company filing its 
accounts and the 
records appearing 
on the database ? 
Austria  Public limited companies (AG) and private limited companies (GmbH)  Yes  12 months  3 months 
Belgium  All public limited companies (SA/NV) companies, private limited companies 
(SPRL/BV/BVBA), partnerships (SNC/VOF/SCS/GCV/SCA/CVA), cooperatives (SC/CV), 
and European Economic Interest Groupings (EEIG) 
Yes  7 months  3 months 
Bulgaria  Joint Stock companies (EAD) are required to publish their annual balance sheet in a 
newspaper and in a Court Trade Register. However, the compliance rate is very low as 
companies prefer to pay a fine in order to avoid publishing their financials. The requirements 
of submitting financials to the Court Trade Register commenced in 2002. It is not compulsory 
for all other company types to officially present their financial statements. 
No, only public 
limited companies, 
although accounts 





Joint stock companies, limited liability companies and cooperatives. Limited liability 
companies and cooperatives only if they meet at least one of the following two legal 
conditions in the previous year: equity more than CZK 20 million and turnover more than 
CZK 40 million. 
No, only if they 
meet at least one of 
the following two 
conditions: equity 
> CZK 20 million 
and turnover > 
CZK 40 million. 
6 months  4-5 weeks 
Denmark  All public limited companies (A/S), private limited companies (ApS), and limited partnerships 
by shares (P/S). Also some limited and general partnerships and profit associations and 
foundations. However, there are some very complicated and detailed legal exceptions to these 
rules. 
Yes  Within 6 months (5 
months for public 
limited companies). 




Estonia  Public limited companies, private limited companies, and cooperatives.  Yes  6 months  12 months 
Finland  All joint-stock companies and all cooperatives that meet two of the following three conditions: 
turnover exceeds FIM 20 million, balance sheet total exceeds FIM 10 million, the average 
number of employees is over 50 
 8  months  n.a. 
France  All public limited companies (SA), private limited companies (SARL), limited partnerships 
(SCS), general partnerships of which the partners are not individuals (SNC), and sole 
proprietorships with limited liability (EURL) 




Germany  Public limited companies (AG), private limited companies (GmbH), and  
registered cooperative societies (“eingetragene Genossenschaft”, e.G.) 
Yes  12 months  4-6 weeks 
Greece  Public and private limited companies (SA)  Yes  6 months  20-40 days 
Hungary  All companies, except proprietorships. Yes  5  months  n.a.   57
Iceland  All public limited companies (HF), private limited companies (EHF), general cooperatives 
(SVF). Partnerships and agricultural cooperatives (Samlagsfelag) only if they fulfill two out of 
the three following prerequisites: total assets over ISK 200 mln , operating revenue over ISK 
400 mln, and average number of employees over 50. 
Yes  8 months  6 weeks 
Ireland  Public limited companies (plc) and private limited companies (ltd).  Yes  46 days  n.a. 
Italy  Public limited companies (S.p.A.) and private limited companies (S.r.l.).  Yes  6 months  5 months 
Latvia  All companies, except sole proprietor enterprises and peasant farms, whose annual turnover 
does not exceed LVL 45,000 (EUR 82,000). 
Yes  From 4 to 10 
months 
9 months 
Lithuania All  companies.  Yes 5  months  n.a. 
Luxembourg 
 
Public limited companies (S.A.), private limited companies (S.A.R.L.) and cooperative 
companies (S.C.) 
Yes  6 months  2 months 
Netherlands  Public limited companies (NV) and private limited companies (BV).  Yes  15 months   
Norway  All limited liability companies. Unlimited liability entities only if turnover exceeds NOK 2 
million. 
Yes  6 months  2 months 
Poland  All joint stock companies, limited liability companies, and partnerships with the following 
criteria: employees over 50, total assets over EURO 1 million, and net profit over EURO 3 
million. 
Only if: employees 
> 50, total assets > 
1 million Euro, and 
net profit > 3 
million Euro. 
9 months  n.a. 
Portugal  All joint-stock companies and private limited companies.  Yes  6 months  2 months 
Romania  Joint stock companies, limited liability companies, and partnerships limited by shares.  Yes  2.5 months  4 months 
Slovak 
Republic 
All joint stock companies (a.s.), limited liability companies (s.r.o.), and cooperatives if they 
meet two of the following three conditions in the previous year: Equity (total assets) > 20 mil. 
SKK, turnover (operating revenue and sales) > 40 mil. SKK, and average number of 
employees > 20. 
  12 months  4-5 weeks 
Slovenia All  companies.  Yes  3 months  4 months for joint 
stock companies, 2 
months for other 
companies 
Spain  All public limited companies (S.A.), private limited companies (S.L.) and limited partnerships  Yes 7  months  n.a. 
Sweden  All public and private limited companies (AB).  Yes  6 months  n.a. 
Switzerland  There are no legal requirements to file  accounts. Listed public limited corporations (AG/SA) 
must file accounts to the stock exchange and publish annual audited financial results in the 
official gazette. Private limited companies (GmbH/Sarl) have no obligatory filings. 
No   3  months 
United 
Kingdom 
Public limited companies (plc) and private limited companies (ltd)  Yes  10 months for ltd’s 
and 7 months for 
plc’s 
10 weeks 
Source: Amadeus, Bureau Van Dijk (supplemented with Dunn  & Bradstreet information for Bulgaria, Iceland, and Ireland using D&B Country Report Guides), and Primark 
Capital Markets Guide 1999. Note: Data excludes proprietorships in all countries.   58
Annex 3: U.S. entry and exit rates, by 2-digit NACE code 
 
Sample of all U.S. corporations. The source for all data is Dunn & Bradstreet.  All data is for 2001.  
NewFirm is the percentage of new corporations, defined as firms of age 0-2.  NewEmp is the percentage of 
employment at new firms.  Exit is the percentage of firms that exited the sample over the same period, 
including closures and acquisitions.  Bankrupt is the percentage of firms that exited following formal 
bankruptcy proceedings.  
 
NACE Industry  NewFirm  NewEmp  Exit  Bankrupt 
10  Mining of coal and lignite; extraction of peat  3.05  1.02 30.32 4.08 
11  Extraction of crude petroleum and natural gas  4.45  1.09 22.37 1.35 
13  Mining of metal ores  3.41  0.44 31.54 2.86 
14  Other mining and quarrying  3.73  0.99 20.68 1.39 
15  Manufacture of food products and beverages  5.24  0.79 20.43 1.91 
16  Manufacture of tobacco products  7.45  0.34 26.89 1.40 
17  Manufacture of textiles  6.92  1.22 20.97 2.46 
18  Manufacture of wearing apparel; fur  6.44  1.32 28.12 3.03 
19  Manufacture of luggage, handbags, and footwear  9.06  2.40 23.16 2.51 
20  Manufacture of wood, except furniture  5.98  1.35 20.89 3.29 
21  Manufacture of pulp, paper and paper products  5.26  6.84 23.24 1.87 
22  Publishing, printing, and recorded media  5.49  1.26 19.06 2.14 
23  Manufacture of coke and petroleum products  5.80  0.25 26.57 0.81 
24  Manufacture of chemicals, and chemical products 6.08  1.51 22.43 1.45 
25  Manufacture of rubber and plastic products  4.46  0.93 17.27 1.79 
26  Manufacture of non-metallic mineral products  5.79  0.90 18.92 1.74 
27  Manufacture of basic metals  4.90  2.79 18.81 2.13 
28  Manufacture of fabricated metal products  5.71  1.13 16.29 1.98 
29  Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c.  4.30  1.26 15.76 1.74 
30  Manufacture of office machinery and computers  8.67  1.28 34.23 2.20 
31  Manufacture of electrical machinery   5.92  1.11 20.13 1.52 
32  Manufacture of communication equipment  8.45  2.07 27.43 2.27 
33  Manufacture of instruments, watches and clocks  5.72  2.14 16.68 1.45 
34  Manufacture of motor vehicles and trailers  5.20  1.05 21.61 2.42 
35  Manufacture of other transport equipment  7.96  1.15 19.61 2.18 
36  Manufacture of furniture; manufacturing n.e.c.  7.92  2.18 19.15 2.33 
40  Electricity, gas, steam and hot water supply  5.56  2.41 33.60 0.88 
41  Collection, purification and distribution of water  1.74 0.46 8.34 0.28 
45  Construction  8.14  3.00 19.89 4.14 
50  Sale, maintenance and repair of motor vehicles  5.05  1.88 17.06 2.74 
51  Wholesale trade and commission trade  5.35  2.09 20.90 1.54 
52  Retail trade, except of motor vehicles  7.19  1.50 22.92 2.81 
55  Hotels and restaurants  5.95  1.53 15.88 2.54 
60  Land transport; transport via pipelines  8.41  2.80 27.82 7.68 
61  Water transport  5.61  1.83 19.47 1.95 
62  Air transport  6.19  0.69 30.27 1.75 
63  Supporting and auxiliary transport activities  6.77  1.60 20.96 1.67 
64  Post and telecommunications  10.09 1.36 31.36 2.14 
70  Real estate activities  5.33  2.19 17.04 1.56 
71  Renting of machinery and equipment  6.34  1.57 27.09 1.93 
72  Computer and related activities  10.73 3.34 25.61 1.91 
73  Research and development  6.53  1.28 17.01 0.93 
74  Other business activities  9.65  3.09 19.66 4.60 
85  Health and social work  2.83  0.78 10.36 1.51 
90  Sewage and refuse disposal and sanitation  5.43  1.44 21.07 2.22 
92  Recreational, cultural and sporting activities  6.46  2.31 14.25 2.35 
93  Other services activities  6.46  3.24 15.37 3.67   59
Annex 4: Legal forms in Europe 
 
Country  Public Limited Company  Private Limited Company 
Austria Aktiengesellschaft  (AG)  Gesellschaft mit beschraekter Haftung (GmbH) 
Belgium  Naamloze Vennootschap (NV), Société Anonyme (SA)  Besloten Vennootschap (BVBA), Société Privée a Responsabilité Limite (SPRL), EBVBA/SPRLU 
Bulgaria  AD or EAD  OOD or EOOD 
Czech Republic  AS  SRO 
Denmark A/S  ApS 
Estonia AS  OÜ 
Finland OYJ  OY 
France  Société Anonyme (SA)  Société a Responsabilité Limite (SARL) 
Germany Aktiengesellschaft  (AG)  Gesellschaft mit beschraekter Haftung (GmbH) 
Greece  SA or AE  EPE 
Hungary RT  Kft 
Ireland  Public Limited Company (PLC)  Private Limited Company (LTD) 
Italy  Societa Per Azioni (SPA)  Societa a Responsabilita Limitata (SRL) 
Latvia AS  SIA 
Lithuania Aktiengesellschaft  (AG)  Gesellschaft mit beschraekter Haftung (GmbH) 
Luxembourg  Société Anonyme (SA)  Société a Responsabilité Limite (SARL) 
Netherlands Naamloze  Vennootschap  (NV)  Besloten Vennootschap (BV) 
Norway AS  AS 
Poland SA  Sp.  zoo. 
Portugal  Sociedade Anónima (SA)  Sociedade por Quotas Responsibilidada Limitada (LDA) 
Romania SA  SRL 
Slovak Republic  AS  SRO 
Spain  Sociedad Anónima (SA)  Sociedad Limitada (SL) 
Sweden  A B (public limited)  A B (private limited) 
Switzerland  Aktiengesellschaft (AG), Société Anonyme (SA)  Gesellschaft mit beschraekter Haftung (GmbH), Société a Responsabilité Limite (SARL) 
United Kingdom  Public Limited Company (PLC)  Private Limited Company (LTD) 
 